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EVERY  MONTH,  AN  IMPORTANT  FRACTION of the population  moves  from 
one economic  activity  to another:  Some  are  laid off and must  seek  work,  or 
they quit to take new  jobs; young  people  leave school and look for work; 
workers  leave  the labor force  because  of disability  or duties  at home. The 
continual  process  of turnover  seems  to be the characteristic  of the modern 
American  economy that distinguishes  it from those of other developed 
countries,  where  the experience  of individual  workers  appears  to be much 
more  stable  over  time.  Is high turnover  inevitable  in a postindustrial  econ- 
omy?  How do the various  demographic  groups  in the labor  force  differ  with 
respect  to turnover?  What  is the relation  between  turnover  and unemploy- 
ment?  What are the social benefits  and costs of turnover  and unemploy- 
ment?  These  are some of the critical  questions  that I address  in this paper. 
Any modern  treatment  of turnover  and unemployment  must  distinguish 
between  the role of events  outside  the control  of the individual  and  the role 
of his response  to his economic  environment.  Fluctuations  in the demand 
for labor are the most important  external  source  of disturbances  in an in- 
dividual's  career,  so it is conventional  to distinguish  between  the demand 
side  of the  problem  and  the supply  side.  Turnover  among  jobs was  the  tradi- 
tional explanation  of the frictional  unemployment  that exists  to some ex- 
tent in every  economy,  but until  recently,  it received  little  discussion.  Even 
ten years  ago, economists  considered  unemployment  a simple  shortage  of 
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jobs, without  asking  how the distribution  of the labor  force  among  the  jobs 
changes  from  month  to month. 
The federal  government's  accidental  experimentation  with a high-pres- 
sure economy  starting  in 1965  brought  about two important  shifts in the 
thinking  of economists  about  unemployment.  First,  it forced  a much  closer 
consideration  of the role of turnover  in the process  that generates  unem- 
ployment.  Economists  can no longer  speak of the employed  and the un- 
employed  as if they were  distinct  groups  over time, although  this mistake 
still appears  in popular  accounts  of unemployment.  Second,  tight labor 
markets  prompted  an examination  of the role of supply-of the voluntary 
activities  of workers-in creating  turnover  and its consequent  unemploy- 
ment.  Workers  can decide  to quit,  and do so in larger  numbers  when  labor 
markets  are tight. Further,  once looking for work, whether  because  they 
chose to or were laid off, workers  make conscious  decisions  about what 
kinds  of job to accept.  The notion  that some  component  of unemployment 
is voluntary,  in the sense  that  through  different  choices  workers  could  lower 
the unemployment  rate,  has been advanced  occasionally.  Obviously,  there 
is heavy political  content  in the debate  about the voluntary  character  of 
unemployment.  Liberals  fighting  for low unemployment  at the cost of high 
inflation  are reluctant  to accept  the suggestion  that part of the unemploy- 
ment they hope to reduce  results  from  the choice of the unemployed. 
The distinction  between  the two recent  developments  in the theory of 
turnover  and  unemployment  is critical.  A student  of turnover  need  not take 
a position  on the importance  of voluntary  activity  in bringing  it about,  and 
measurements  of turnover  do not themselves  shed  much  light on the ques- 
tion of the voluntary  character  of unemployment.  The finding  that blacks, 
women,  or teenagers  become  unemployed  more  frequently  than  adult  white 
males  tells  nothing  about  the responsibility  of unemployed  workers  in these 
groups  for their  own  plights.  The first  part  of this paper  is devoted  to more 
refined  measurement  of turnover  using  data  that do not permit  separation 
of the influences  of external  events  (mainly  layoffs)  from  those of the con- 
scious  decisions  of individuals. 
I shall  say something  about  the relative  importance  of conditions  on the 
supply  side  and  the demand  side,  however.  Most of my evidence  is indirect, 
but it leaves  the impression  that  fluctuations  in the demand  for labor  are  a 
critical  aspect  of the process  of turnover. 
The  focus  of the paper  is almost  exclusively  on turnover  among  members 
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jobs and find  new  jobs. Inadequate  data make  it difficult  to deal with the 
equally  important  problem  of movements  in and out of the labor force. 
The  Theory  of Turnover 
A general  theory  of turnover  underlies  the whole  paper.  On the demand 
side  I consider  the economy  as composed  of a large  number  of employers, 
most of whom account  for only a tiny part of the whole.' Employers  sell 
relatively  specialized  products  and so face random  fluctuations  in demand. 
Most of the fluctuations  are  unrelated  to changes  in the overall  rate  of eco- 
nomic  activity  and thus tend to cancel  each other  statistically  when  aggre- 
gate output  or employment  is calculated.  Employers  meet  their  fluctuating 
needs  for labor  through  a personnel  policy  that  balances  the costs of hiring 
and firing  against  the costs of holding  excess  workers  during  a period of 
slack or of paying  overtime  and using  temporary  sources  of labor during 
periods  of peak  demand.  An important  question  is how much  training  and 
knowledge  will be lost if a worker  leaves  one firm  and  takes  a job with an- 
other.2  Workers  with  a good deal  of such  training-for example,  those  with 
positions  in a bureaucracy  who communicate  with many other  workers- 
will be held as overhead  labor  during  a slump  when  those whose  skills  can 
be replaced  with little cost will be laid off. Further,  the layoff  policy of a 
firm  depends  on conditions  in the labor  market  in which  it hires.  The ap- 
parent  sensitivity  of this dependence  is one of the surprising  findings  of this 
paper.  In slack  markets,  firms  have  a good chance  of recalling  workers  who 
are  laid off, and,  in any  case,  find  it easy  to recruit  qualified  replacements.3 
Thus,  everything  else held  constant,  firms  should  lay off workers  more  fre- 
quently  in slack  markets. 
Workers  also face  events  that are  random,  at least  from  the point of view 
of the observer.  They  may  learn  about  better  jobs or decide  to change  their 
1. By "employer"  I mean the productive  unit, not necessarily  the firm. Large firms 
producing  a variety  of products  in a number  of plants should be considered  as a group 
of separate  units for the purposes  of the theory. 
2. This is what Gary Becker calls "firm-specific"  human capital. See his Human 
Capital:  A  Theoretical  and  Empirical  Analysis,  with Special  Reference  to  Education 
(Columbia University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964), 
pp. 18-29. 
3. This seems to hold even apart from the fact that slack markets  may have unem- 
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types  of work.  Again,  their  decisions  to quit  will depend  on the amount  of 
the loss involved  and the cost of finding  new work. Everything  else held 
constant,  slack  markets  should  discourage  quits. 
Unemployment  is one of the key variables  in a theory  of turnover  be- 
cause  it serves  as the main indicator  of distress  in labor  markets.  Basic  to 
understanding  the relation  between  turnover  and  unemployment  is the fact 
that only a fraction  of those looking for work ever become  unemployed. 
To be recorded  as unemployed,  a person  must  be out of work  and  looking 
for work.  A worker  who quits  his present  job to take  a new  one  never  enters 
unemployment.  The same  rate  of turnover  among  jobs, as measured  by the 
sum of quits  and  layoffs,  will correspond  to a higher  unemployment  rate  if 
there  is a higher  proportion  of layoffs.  As George  Perry  has pointed  out, 
the probability  that an individual  looking for work will become unem- 
ployed  is a more  sensitive  indicator  of conditions  in the labor  market  than 
is the probability  that a person,  once  unemployed,  will  find  work  in a given 
time period.4 
Preview 
This  paper  discusses  the results  of two empirical  studies  of turnover.  The 
first  covers  the entire  population  of working  age and  uses  data  on the num- 
ber of spells and the number  of weeks of unemployment  reported  by in- 
dividuals  to estimate  the probability  that an individual  with particular 
characteristics  will  become  unemployed  in a given  week  if not unemployed, 
or that he will leave unemployment  if already  unemployed.  From these 
probabilities  it is possible  to derive  the fraction  of the year that each in- 
dividual  should  expect  to be unemployed.  The results  of this study  can be 
used to break  down unemployment  rates of demographic  and economic 
groups  into components  of frequency,  measured  directly  as the probability 
of becoming  unemployed,  and duration,  measured  as the inverse  of the 
probability  of leaving  unemployment. 
The second  study  covers  only men aged  45 and above  and is concerned 
with  job changes.  It distinguishes  voluntary  changes,  generally  quits,  from 
involuntary  changes,  mainly  layoffs.  The data  are  drawn  from  employment 
histories,  so it is possible  to examine  the important  relation  between  length 
of tenure  and the probability  of leaving  the job. 
4. "Unemployment  Flows in the U.S. Labor Market," Brookings  Papers on Eco- 
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The  third  part  of the paper  brings  the results  of the first  study  to bear  on 
the issue of the geographical  distribution  of turnover.  Data on turnover 
from  the official  data  for manufacturing  industries  are  also discussed. 
Four  main  themes  appear  in the discussion  of these  studies.  First,  layoffs 
are  a major  source  of turnover,  especially  of  job changes  that  require  a spell 
of unemployment.  Further,  layoffs  are  extremely  sensitive  to conditions  in 
the labor  market.  This shows  up most clearly  in the comparison  of cities- 
Chicago,  a city with a tight  market,  consistently  has layoff  rates  that are  a 
small  fraction  of the national  average.  In the concluding  section,  I argue 
that the sensitivity  of layoff rates to the degree  of tightness  is one of the 
obstacles  to a direct  attack  on unemployment  by expansion  of aggregate 
demand:  In an economy  with  low unemployment  and  low layoff  rates,  em- 
ployers  cannot  afford  to pay real  wages  that are as high as they could  pay 
during  a period  of sustained  higher  unemployment.5 
Second,  turnover  is much  higher  among  workers  who have taken their 
current  jobs recently.  This is shown  indirectly  in the pattern  of declining 
frequency  of unemployment  with age revealed  in the study covering  the 
entire  population.  It appears  directly  in the results  of the study  of mature 
men: The probability  of both layoffs  and quits  drops  rapidly  over  the first 
few years on the job. The process  of gathering  information  is symmetric 
between  employers,  who are likely to discharge  a worker  in the first few 
months  of employment  if he proves  unsatisfactory,  and workers,  who are 
likely  to leave a job in the first  few months  if it proves  unsatisfactory.  The 
importance  of the employer  in this process  should  not be overlooked. 
Third,  most of the very  large  difference  between  the unemployment  rates 
of blacks  and whites  is associated  with differences  in the frequency  of un- 
employment  rather  than  in its duration.  This  is apparent  from  the  published 
data  on the duration  of unemployment  for  blacks  and  whites.  The  contribu- 
tion of my study  is to show  that  the conclusion  is just as strong  after  exten- 
sive adjustment  for the personal  characteristics  of the two groups.  Further, 
my study  of mature  men  makes  it possible  to compare  layoff  and  quit  rates 
for blacks  and  whites,  a comparison  that  is not possible  with  the published 
data. The results  are striking:  Blacks  have the same  likelihood  of quitting 
but are more likely  to be laid off. 
Finally, the first study sheds some light on the comparison  between 
5. Here I am comparing  one steady state to another.  The dynamic  operation  of the 
labor market  in response  to fluctuations  in aggregate  demand  is beyond  the scope of the 
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women and men. The duration  of unemployment  is somewhat  shorter 
among  women  than among  men, so the difference  in their  unemployment 
rates  is less than  the difference  in their  turnover  rates.  I have  no results  for 
women comparable  with those for mature  men, in which layoffs can be 
distinguished  from quits, but I again caution against  the conclusion  that 
high turnover  is a symptom  of greater  willingness  to become  unemployed, 
or that women  have only a marginal  attachment  to the labor  force. 
APPROACHES  TO THE STUDY  OF TURNOVER 
Turnover  is a probabilistic  phenomenon.  Random events outside the 
control of an individual  affect  his behavior,  and his behavior  itself may 
have a random  element.  Any study  of turnover,  therefore,  requires  a theo- 
retical  and  empirical  framework  in which  the role of probability  is explicit. 
Past work on unemployment  and turnover  has generally  proceeded  by 
isolating  one dimension  of turnover,  defining  a variable  that measured  it, 
and estimating  a regression  model relating  it to a variety  of right-hand 
variables.  For example,  my first  paper  for the Brookings  panel presented 
the results  of a regression  in which  weeks of unemployment  was the left- 
hand  variable.6  George  Perry  has recently  used the weekly  probability  of 
remaining  unemployed  as the left-hand  variable.7  Although  I have  no fun- 
damental  objection  to this approach,  I believe  there  may be advantages  to 
dealing  more  directly  with the underlying  probabilities  in a unified  model 
of turnover,  from  which  results  like the average  number  of weeks  of unem- 
ployment  can be derived. 
The basis  of my approach  is to consider  a small  set of alternative  activi- 
ties in which  an individual  might  engage.  I then estimate  the probabilities 
of moving  from one activity  to another  as functions  of the characteristics 
of the individual  and of his environment,  and of his history.  From these 
probabilities  of movement  (and  from  those of remaining  in the same  activ- 
ity) it is possible  to calculate  the probabilities  of being  in each activity  at a 
given time, no longer  conditional  on past activities.  Thus the final result 
of my study  of unemployment,  for example,  is the probability  that an in- 
dividual  will be unemployed  at a given  time. 
6. "Why Is the Unemployment Rate So High at Full Employment?"  Brookings 
Papers  on Econzomic  Activity  (3:1970), pp. 369-402. 
7. "Unemployment  Flows." Robert E. Hall  715 
Probabilities  of Entering  and  Leaving  Unemployment 
This section  presents  the results  of an empirical  application  of the very 
simplest  model of the sort proposed  above. Only two activities  are con- 
sidered:  not unemployed  and unemployed.8  Because  of my particular  in- 
terest  in the geographical  pattern  of unemployment,  the form  of the model 
is strongly  circumscribed  by the nature  of the data available.  Much more 
elaborate  and realistic  models  can be estimated  when the data consist of 
actual  employment  histories,  but at present  no longitudinal  data  with  satis- 
factory geographical  coverage are available.  A number of large cross- 
sections,  including  the 1967  Survey  of Economic  Opportunity  used in this 
study, report  two statistics  that by a happy coincidence  are suitable  for 
estimating  a simple  but useful  model  of turnover-the number  of weeks  of 
unemployment  and  the number  of spells  of unemployment  over  the course 
of a year.  The model  posits a probability,  a, that a worker  who is not un- 
employed  in one  week  will  be unemployed  the  following  week,  and  a second 
probability,  3, that a worker  who is unemployed  one week  will not be un- 
employed  the next  week.  Then  a measures  the frequency  of unemployment 
and A is inversely  related  to the duration  of unemployment.  Appendix  A 
discusses  the method  I have used to estimate  a and  A from  the data  in the 
Survey  of Economic  Opportunity  (conducted  by the Bureau  of the Census 
in the spring  of 1967)  on the number  of weeks and the number  of spells 
of unemployment  in 1966. The method  is based on the fact that, except 
for spells  at the beginning  and  end of the year,  the number  of spells  is both 
the number  of times  an individual  became  unemployed  and the number  of 
times he left unemployment.  The number  of times he could have become 
unemployed  is the number  of weeks  he was not unemployed,  and  the num- 
ber of times he could have left unemployment  is the number  of weeks of 
unemployment.  Thus, data are available  to construct  frequencies  for each 
individual  that correspond  to the underlying  probabilities,  a  and 3. To 
these frequencies  I fitted a statistical  model of the logit form in which  ax 
and  A are  considered  functions  of the characteristics  of the individual.  The 
8. Not unemployed  includes  both employed  and out of the labor force. The data do 
not permit  the distinction  between  becoming  unemployed  after working  and becoming 
unemployed  after an absence  from the labor force, though such a distinction  would be 
valuable. Since the second source of unemployment  is more important  than the first 
among some groups, excluding  those not in the labor force from my estimates  is not a 
satisfactory  solution. 716  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
logit model is not a linear  regression,  although  it can be thought  of as a 
nonlinear  regression.  Its precise  form is given  in Appendix  A. 
Table 1 presents  the probabilities  calculated  from the statistical  results 
of Appendix  A. These probabilities  should be interpreted  in the follow- 
Table 1.  Weekly Probabilities of Entering and Leaving Unemployment, 
and Fraction of the Year Unemployed, for Men with Selected 
Characteristics, 1966 
Percent 
Weekly  probability 
Fraction  of 
Of becoming  Of leaving  the year 
Characteristic  unemployed  unemployment unemployed 
Color 
Black  0.38  10.2  3.6 
Whites  0.22  13.6  1.6 
Wage rate per hour (dollars) 
1.50  0.28  11.0  2.5 
2.00  0.24  12.5  1.9 
3.00  0.22  13.6  1.6 
4.00  0.16  12.3  1.3 
Annual family income per adult (dollars) 
2,000  0.21  13.8  1.5 
4,000a  0.22  13.6  1.6 
7,000  0.15  9.8  1.5 
10,000  0.27  10.1  2.6 
Age (years) 
18  0.22  22.2  1.0 
22  0.32  16.5  1.9 
30  0.22  13.6  1.6 
45  0.16  15.3  1.0 
65  0.16  12.6  1.3 
Type of worker 
Not reported  0.12  5.5  2.1 
Private  wage or salarya  0.22  13.6  1.6 
Government  0.10  12.2  0.8 
Self-employed 
Salaried  0.25  29.9  0.8 
Not salaried  0.09  16.0  0.6 
Marital  status 
Marrieds  0.22  13.6  1.6 
Not married  0.40  12.0  3.2 
Source: Calculated from statistical results of Appendix A below. 
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ing way: There  is a reference  group  to which  the constant  in the equation 
refers  (white,  preschool  children  only,  living  in New York,  expected  to earn 
$3.00  per hour if a man or $2.00 per hour if a woman,  family  income of 
$4,000  per  year  per adult,  age 30, private  wage  or salary  worker,  and mar- 
ried).  For each  characteristic,  the probabilities  are  calculated  for each  of its 
values,  holding  the other  characteristics  at their  reference  values  (indicated 
by note a in Tables 1 and 2). Thus the variations  in the probabilities  for 
alternative  values  of one characteristic  measure  the pure  effects  of varying 
that  characteristic.  The  mathematical  form  of the specification  is essentially 
multiplicative.  Thus, for example,  the probability  that an unmarried  22- 
year-old  man will become unemployed  is (0.32/0.22) X (0.40/0.22)  times 
higher  than  the  probability  for the reference  group  of married  30-year-olds. 
Also shown  in the tables  is the derived  fraction  of the year  unemployed. 
This is also the fraction  of the population  that is unemployed  in a given 
week.  If it remains  the same  from  one week  to the  next,  it has the following 
relation to ax  and  3: 
u  =  a(1  -  u)  +  (1  -  f)u; 
of the fraction  1 -  u of the population  not unemployed  last week,  a have 
just become unemployed,  and of the fraction  u unemployed  last week, 
1-  remain  unemployed.  This equation  can be solved  to get 
a 
u  = 
ae +  A 
which  is presented  in the third  column  of Tables 1 and 2. 
For men, the results  show that most of the very substantial  difference 
between  the unemployment  rates of blacks and whites  is associated  with 
higher  frequency  rather  than longer duration  of unemployment.9  Blacks 
are 73 percent  more likely to become unemployed  than whites, and, if 
unemployed,  are 25 percent  less likely  to leave unemployment  each week. 
Since  these results  take account  of the tendency  for blacks  to have other 
characteristics  that are associated  with high turnover-they have fewer 
9. Much the same result is reported  by Ralph E. Smith and Charles  C. Holt, in "A 
Job Search-Turnover  Analysis  of the Black-White  Unemployment  Ratio," in Gerald  G. 
Somers (ed.), Proceedings  of the Twenty-third  Annual Winter  Meeting, 1970, Industrial 
Relations Research  Association Series (IRRA, 1971), pp. 76-86. Their analysis of the 
published  data on the duration  of unemployment  does not consider  dependence  of the 
frequency  and duration  of unemployment  on detailed individual  characteristics,  as my 
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skills,  are somewhat  younger,  and are  less likely  to be married-they show 
rather  strikingly  the magnitude  of the problem  they encounter  in the labor 
market.  Blacks  have  somewhat  more  trouble  than  whites  in findingjobs,  and 
a great  deal of difficulty  in keeping  them.  Discrimination  seems  to take  the 
form of restricting  blacks to unstable  jobs while whites are able to find 
permanent  and high-paying  jobs. I have discussed  this phenomenon  at 
length  in my two previous  contributions  to Brookings  Papers,  and regard 
these  results  as confirming  my earlier  view  with  more  direct  evidence.  More- 
over,  evidence  from  my study  of mature  men,  discussed  in the next  section, 
sheds  light on the ambiguity  about where  the responsibility  for turnover 
lies-with  the worker  or the employer-that my earlier  work left unre- 
solved.10  The results  from  the current  study  tend to support  the view  that 
it is the instability  of the  jobs open  to blacks  much  more  than  the instability 
of the blacks  that is the heart  of the problem. 
Workers  with  few  skills  (those  expected  to earn  $1.50  per  hour)  and  those 
with average  skills ($3.00 per hour) have smaller  frequency  and duration 
differentials  than  is the case with  race:  Unskilled  men are 27 percent  more 
likely  to become  unemployed  and 19 percent  less likely  each  week  to leave 
unemployment. 
The  results  for teenagers  are  inconsistent  with  the official  unemployment 
rates. They suggest  that teenagers  are about as likely to become unem- 
ployed each week of the year as 30-year-olds,  and 63 percent  more likely 
to leave unemployment  in each week of unemployment.  Together  these 
imply that 18-year-olds  who have all the reference  characteristics  except 
tor age spend only 1 percent  of the year, about three  days, unemployed. 
Even after  taking  account  of the fact that teenagers  do not generally  have 
the reference  values  of other  characteristics-they  earn  less than $3.00  per 
hour  and  are  less  likely  to be married-the fraction  of the  year  unemployed 
is less than that suggested  by the official  data.11  The results  for other  age 
10. Two years ago I wrote, "Some groups exhibit what seems to be pathological 
instability  in holding  jobs. Changing  from one low-paying,  unpleasant  job to another, 
often several  times a year, is the typical pattern  of some workers."  ("Why  Is the Unem- 
ployment  Rate So High?" p. 389.) Many other writers  have made similar  statements. 
11. The fraction of the year unemployed  is the product of the unemployment  rate 
and the fraction  of the year in the labor force.  The official  unemployment  rate for white 
males  aged 18 and 19 in 1966  was 8.9 percent  and the average  participation  rate over the 
year  was 65.4 percent,  suggesting  that they spend 5.82 percent  of the year unemployed. 
Both the SEO and the Current  Population Survey of the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
obtain data from a single respondent  in the household,  rarely  a teenager  and probably 
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groups  do not seem  to disagree  with the official  data as seriously.  Twenty- 
two-year-old  men are  45 percent  more  likely  than 30-year-olds  to become 
unemployed  and  21 percent  more  likely  to leave  unemployment  each  week. 
Forty-five-year-olds  are  27 percent  less likely  than 30-year-olds  to become 
unemployed  and 12 percent  more likely  to leave  unemployment.  It seems 
clear  that  adults  over  the age of 30 are  able  to find  significantly  more  stable 
employment  than  are  young  adults.  The  magnitude  of the differences  seems 
consistent,  however,  with  the view  that  they  arise  from  experimentation  by 
employers  with young workers,  in which they find likely candidates  for 
permanent  employment,  and similar  experimentation  among  young  work- 
ers  trying  out alternative  jobs. The  latter  process,  often  called  job shopping, 
receives  more attention in most discussions  of turnover  among young 
adults,  but I suspect  the role of employers  is just as important. 
Taken  together,  the results  for men seem  to confirm  the view  that differ- 
ences  in turnover,  as measured  by the frequency  of unemployment,  are if 
anything  more  important  than  differences  in duration  as a symptom  of the 
adverse  experience  of some  groups  in the labor  force.  At this  point  I should 
emphasize  that high turnover  is not necessarily  evidence  that unemploy- 
ment  is somehow  voluntary  and  therefore  not burdensome  to those  experi- 
encing  it. In fact, my results  suggest  that the frequency  of unemployment 
may  be somewhat  lower  for individuals  with  higher  incomes,  while  a theory 
of voluntary  turnover  presumably  would  suggest  that  frequency  would  rise 
with  income.  On the other  hand,  the results  do offer  a little  support  for the 
view  that  individuals  who are  better  off take  longer  to find  work  once  they 
are unemployed. 
Interpretation  of the results  for women  is somewhat  more difficult  be- 
cause  they  have  lower  and  more  variable  rates  of participation  in the labor 
force. To overcome  this problem,  I have chosen private  wage and salary 
workers  as the reference  type of worker  because  they have high participa- 
tion rates.  The type refers  to the job held longest  during  1966  and among 
women  most of the responses  of "not  reported"  come  from  those  who did 
not work  at all during  the year.  Even  so, the variation  in participation  rates 
for alternative  values  of a given characteristic  should  be kept in mind in 
interpreting  the probabilities  of becoming  unemployed  and the fraction  of 
the year unemployed  shown in Table 2 (the latter is the product  of the 
participation  rate and the unemployment  rate). 
Comparison  of Tables  1 and  2 suggests  that  women  who are  not definitely 
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Table 2.  Weekly Probabilities of Entering and Leaving Unemployment, 
and Fraction of the Year Unemployed, for Women with Selected 
Characteristics,  1966 
Percent 
Weekly  probability 
Fraction  of 
Of becoming  Of leaving  the year 
Characteristic  unemployed  unemployment unemployed 
Color 
Black  0.68  10.6  6.0 
Whites  0.32  15.1  2.1 
Wage rate per hour (dollars) 
1.50  0.27  17.5  1.5 
2.00a  0.32  15.1  2.1 
3.00  0.20  34.5  0.6 
4.00  0.12  9.5  1.2 
Annual family income per adult (dollars) 
2,000  0.40  15.1  2.6 
4,000  0.32  15.1  2.1 
7,000  0.29  10.3  2.7 
10,000  0.04  6.8  0.6 
Age (years) 
18  0.41  21.5  1.9 
22  0.53  15.6  3.3 
30a  0.32  15.1  2.1 
45  0.24  14.3  1.7 
65  0.21  12.8  1.6 
Type of worker 
Not reported  0.09  20.6  0.4 
Private  wage or salarya  0.32  15.1  2.1 
Government  0.15  14.1  1.1 
Self-employed 
Salaried  1.15  13.8  7.7 
Not salaried  0.20  18.1  1.1 
Marital  status 
Marrieds  0.32  15.1  2.1 
Not married  0.40  14.3  2.7 
Source: Calculated from statistical results of Appendix A below. 
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ment  than  do men  in practically  every  category.'2  Black  women  have  more 
than twice  the frequency  of white  women  in the reference  group,  close to 
twice that of comparable  black men, and more than three times that of 
white  men.  White  women  are  more  than  30 percent  more  likely than com- 
parable  white men earning  the same wage to become unemployed  (0.32 
percent  against  0.24  percent).  The data  do not permit  the division  of unem- 
ployment  among  women  between  that associated  with  movements  into the 
labor  force  after  prolonged  absence  and that arising  from  interruptions  of 
more or less continuous  periods  in the labor  force.'3 
The duration  of unemployment  seems  to be slightly  less among  women 
than  among  comparable  men: Unemployed  black  women  have  a probabil- 
ity of 10.6  percent  of leaving  unemployment  against  9.4 percent  for black 
men, while white women  have a probability  of 15.1 percent  against  12.5 
percent  for  white  men,  again  adjusting  the  figures  for  men  to the $2.00  refer- 
ence  wage.  It is dangerous  to infer  from  these  figures  that  women  find  jobs 
as quickly  as men, since  women  are  probably  more  likely  than  men  to ter- 
minate  unemployment  by leaving  the labor  force.'4 
Since  the duration  of unemployment  is less for women  than  for men,  the 
difference  in their  unemployment  rates  understates  the difference  in their 
frequencies  of unemployment.  The instability  of employment  of women, 
especially  black  women,  is a problem  of the first  magnitude.  I suspect  that 
a large  part of the problem  arises,  as it does with black  men, from  the in- 
stability  of the  jobs available  to women  and not from  the instability  of the 
women  themselves.'5 
The influence  of other  characteristics  on frequency  and duration  seems 
12. The comparison  requires  some care. The reference  wage for men is $3.00 per 
hour while that for women is $2.00 per hour. Table 1 would be only slightly  different 
if a reference  wage of $2.00 were used, but Table 2 would be quite different  if the refer- 
ence wage were $3.00. 
13. Only the longitudinal  data  just becoming  available  can answer  this question (see 
note 16). The Current  Population  Survey  tabulates  unemployment  by cause (quit, layoff, 
new entrant, and reentrant)  but provides no information  on the previous activity of 
reentrants. 
14. George Perry  presents  evidence  on this point in "Unemployment  Flows." 
15. Part of this is associated  with the crowding  of women into occupations  with high 
turnover.  Occupation  is not included  in the equation  because  it is not a personal  charac- 
teristic nor a good indicator of the markets  that an individual  can participate  in. Its 
inclusion  would give rise to a set of occupational  effects  that would partially  obscure  the 
differences  between  men and women without being explicable  themselves. 722  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1972 
to be about  the same  for women  as for men. Frequency  declines  with in- 
creasing  wage rates while duration  increases  (except for the figure for 
$3.00  per  hour,  which  seems  to be a statistical  fluke).  Higher  income  exerts 
more  downward  pressure  on the probability  of becoming  unemployed  for 
women than for men, probably  mainly because  of the negative  relation 
between  income  and labor force  participation  for women.  The pattern  of 
decreasing  frequency  and increasing  duration  of unemployment  with age 
is similar  to that found for men. Unmarried  women  are somewhat  more 
likely  to become  unemployed  than  married  women,  but  the effect  of marital 
status  is so much  less than in the case of men that unmarried  women  and 
unmarried  men  have  almost  the same  probability  of becoming  unemployed. 
JOB CHANGES  AMONG MATURE MEN 
As a group,  mature  men exhibit  substantial  employment  stability.  This 
is apparent  in the results  on the frequency  of unemployment  presented 
earlier:  White  males  aged  45 have a weekly  probability  of entering  unem- 
ployment  of only 0.16 percent,  or about  8 percent  per year.  Here  I will re- 
port  briefly  on a study  of annual  job changes  among  mature  men.  The  data 
for this study  were  taken  from  the 1966-67  National  Longitudinal  Surveys, 
directed  by Herbert  Parnes.16  The data give  the status  of about  5,000 men 
in 1966  and again  in 1967,  together  with partial  employment  histories  for 
each. My study  is based on changes  in jobs between  adjacent  years  from 
1962  to 1967.  Using methods  similar  to those discussed  in Appendix  A, I 
have estimated  the probabilities  that an employed  worker  will leave a job 
involuntarily,  because  of a layoff,  or voluntarily,  by quitting.  These  proba- 
bilities  are functions  of personal  characteristics-race,  years  of education, 
and age-and  dummy  variables  for the years. In addition,  time on the 
present  iob is a determinant.17 
16. National Longitudinal  Surveys-The Survey  of Work Experience  of Men 45-59 
Years of Age, sponsored  by the Manpower  Administration  of the U.S. Department  of 
Labor, and conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Tabulations  from the data 
appear in U.S. Department  of Labor, Manpower  Administration,  The  Pre-Retirement 
Years,  Manpower  Research  Monograph 15, Vol. 1 (1970) and Vol. 2 (1970). The raw 
data were obtained  from the Bureau  of the Census. 
17. In this respect  the model is a substantial  improvement  over the one applied  to the 
data on unemployment  in the SEO. The improvement  is made possible by the fact that 
the Parnes  data give actual  job histories  and not just summary  data. The reader  should 
also note that my study  of mature  men focuses  on the probability  of changing  jobs rather 
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Table 3. Annual Probabilities of Males 45-59  Years of Age Taking New 
Jobs, by Reason, 1962-67 Experience 
Percent 
Annual  probability  for employed  worker 
Of takitng  new  job next  year,  by reason 
Of remaining 
Characteristic  Layoff  Quit  at same  job 
Color 
Whitea  1.2  2.6  96.2 
Black  1.4  2.6  96.0 
Years on job 
0  5.0  15.2  79.9 
1  1.9  6.1  92.0 
3  1.0  3.6  95.4 
6a  1.2  2.6  96.2 
15  0.6  1.1  98.3 
40  0.2  0.7  99.1 
Source:  Author's estimates derived from  the  National  Longitudinal Surveys-The  Survey of  Work 
Experience of Men 45-59 Years of Age, sponsored by the Manpower Administration of the U.S.  Depart- 
ment of Labor, and conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Data used here are based on changes in 
jobs in adjacent years between 1962 and 1967. 
a. Values of the characteristic  used in calculations for other categories. 
The  results  are  summarized  in Table  3. Certain  biases  inherent  in the data 
deserve  mention.  First,  turnover  is understated  because  the method  of col- 
lecting  the partial  employment  histories  causes  workers  with high turnover 
to contribute  fewer  years  of data  to the study.  I attempted  to minimize  this 
effect  by using only a few recent  years,  discarding  a great  many observa- 
tions  for earlier  years  from  more  stable  workers.  Turnover  is further  under- 
stated  by the use of an annual  interval  between  observations.  A worker  who 
changes  jobs more  than once in a year  is counted  only once in this study. 
Third,  the probability  of layoff is understated  because  only those layoffs 
that resulted  in a job change  are counted;  those terminated  by recall  are 
ignored, even though they result in unemployment.18  Subject  to these 
qualifications,  the results  show that a white  male, 50 years  old, with a col- 
lege education  and six years  on the  job had a probability  of 1.2 percent  of 
being  forced  to change  jobs because  of a layoff  in 1965.  The probability  of 
his quitting,  at 2.6 percent,  was more than twice as high. A comparable 
black  was  slightly  more  likely  to be laid off  (1.4  percent)  and  no more  likely 
18. Laid-off  workers  are counted as unemployed  in the official  data even if they are 
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than a white to quit. Among mature men, turnover is only slightly higlher 
for blacks than for whites, and the difference  is in layoffs, not quits. There 
is no evidence here of greater voluntary instability among blacks. 
The probabilities of both layoffs and quits are much higher early in a 
worker's  tenure on the job. In the first few months a worker in the reference 
group faces a probability of 5 percent per year (or about 0.4 percent per 
month) of losing his job. Layoff here includes any involuntary separation 
including discharge. It is clear that employers gather information rapidly 
in the early months of employing a worker, and are much more likely to 
send him away at that time than after he has accumulated  knowledge and 
training.  Institutions operating  both through collective bargaining  and out- 
side it protect the individual's and the firm's investment in firm-specific 
human capital by requiring  that the least experienced  workers be laid off 
first.19  The probability of quitting declines even more rapidly with tenure. 
Individuals  are most likely to leave a job when they have found out exactly 
what it involves but have not made a substantial  personal investment  whose 
future returns would be sacrificed  by quitting. 
Turnover  in Twelve Large Cities 
Up to now I have focused on the determinants of individual turnover, 
taking the economic environment  as given. In this section I will reexamine 
my earlier  results in terms of the theory of economic equilibrium. The aim 
is to say something about the way the economic environment is shaped by 
the collective actions of large numbers of workers and employers. I have 
chosen to look at the geographical  dimension of turnover, simply because 
that dimension is identified  explicitly  in the data. The reader  will recognize 
similarities  between my discussion of differences  among cities and George 
Perry's  discussion of differences  over time.20 
A fair amount of agreement seems to exist about the ingredients of a 
19. Inverse  seniority  provisions  that allow the most senior  workers  to be laid off first 
are  a special  form  of vacation  (with  a highly  favorable  tax treatment)  and do not involve 
permanent  separation  of the worker  from the employer.  Martin  Feldstein  has recently 
caled attention  to the importance  of unemployment  compensation  and  provisions  of col- 
lective  bargaining  agreements  in this  connection.  See his "Lowering  the Permanent  Rate 
of Unemployment,"  A Preliminary  Report  Prepared  for the Joint  Economic  Commriittee 
of the U.S. Congress  (no date; processed). 
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theory of geographical  differences  among labor markets.  Following  is a 
list of general  considerations  that most economists  would  find  important: 
1. Workers  can migrate  from one city to another.  Their  propensity  to 
do so depends  on relative  wages,  relative  stability  of jobs, and the relative 
costs of finding  jobs. 
2. Employers  can migrate  as well. Their  location decisions  depend  on 
relative  wages,  relative  stability  of workers,  and  relative  costs of recruiting 
workers. 
3. Wages  rise  faster  in cities  with tight  labor  markets  than  in those  with 
loose ones. Unemployed  workers  demand  high wages when they become 
unemployed  and lower  their  aspirations  as their  periods  of unemployment 
continue. 
4. Random  shifts  in the demand  for goods produced  in each city occur 
continually.  Thus at any point in time, the pattern  of differences  among 
cities will not necessarily  represent  an equilibrium  of the slow-working 
process  of migration  and wage adjustment. 
5. Cities differ in their attractiveness  to workers and employers.  In 
equilibrium,  wages 'iould  embody  "equalizing  differences"  to account  for 
these differences. 
The theories  propo, Id  by various  economists  differ  mainly  in the im- 
portance assigned  to these considerations,  which in turn varies partly 
according  to the contexts  in which  geographical  differences  in labor  mar- 
kets have been examined.  John Harris  and Michael  Todaro,  in studying 
urban  and rural  labor markets  in Africa,  took wage differentials  and the 
location  of employers  as given and examined  the equilibrium  rates  of un- 
employment  that arise  when migration  of workers  equates  the rural  and 
urban  wages,  where  the latter  are adjusted  for the expected  cost of finding 
work.2'  They concluded  that if urban  wages are held higher  than rural 
wages  by governmental  or other  forces,  workers  will migrate  to the cities 
until the urban  unemployment  rate times the urban  wage is equal to the 
wage differential.  In a recent  unpublished  paper, Joseph  Stiglitz  has ex- 
tended their model to consider  the relation  between  the wages and pro- 
ductivity  of workers  and their rate of turnover.22  He argues  that wage 
21. John R. Harris  and Michael  P. Todaro, "Migration,  Unemployment  and Devel- 
opment: A Two-Sector  Analysis,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 60 (March 1970), 
pp. 126-42. 
22. "Alternative  Theories  of Wage Determination  and Unemployment  in L.D.C.'s: 
I. The Labor  Turnover  Model," Discussion  Paper  No. 335 (Cowles  Foundation  for Re- 
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differentials  can be explained  by the low turnover  of urban  workers,  which 
in turn  is explained  by high urban  wages  and unemployment  rates. 
Within the context of the theory of inflation,  Lipsey,  Archibald,  and 
Tobin have emphasized  random shifts in demand across geographical 
areas.23  Although  workers  and employers  respond  to these shifts  through 
migration  and relocation,  they do so with a lag so that the markets  are in 
"perpetual  disequilibrium,"  in Tobin's  words.24 
In my earlier  paper,  "Why  Is the Unemployment  Rate So High at Full 
Employment?"  I studied  the unemployment  rates  in twelve  large  cities of 
the United  States  in 1966.  I concluded  that  relatively  little  of the substantial 
differences  in their  unemployment  rates  could be explained  by recent  ran- 
dom changes  in demand,  because  the pattern  across  cities  is so stable  over 
time. The accumulation  of data for two more years  has not changed  this 
conclusion.  I also noted a positive correlation  between  wage rates and 
unemployment  rates  in the cities,  and offered  the conjecture  that a process 
somewhat  like that later proposed  by Stiglitz  was at work: High wages 
could  be paid  in cities  with  high unemployment  rates  precisely  because  the 
high rates  discourage  quits,  and a work  force  with a low quit rate  is more 
productive.  According  to this conjecture,  an equilibrium  could exist with 
very different  unemployment  rates  among  cities in which  no incentive  ex- 
isted for either  workers  or employers  to migrate.  I think  it is worth  elabo- 
rating  on this conjecture  by developing  an explicit  theory  along  the lines it 
suggests.  I have done so in Appendix  B and have summarized  the results 
for a single  city in Figure  1. Workers  are in equilibrium  when  the wage  in 
this city, w, adjusted  by the unemployment  rate,  u, is equal  to the adjusted 
wage  elsewhere: 
(1-  u)w =  w, or w =  1- 
Employers  are in equilibrium  when the wage they pay is matched  by the 
productivity  of workers  in this market,  xh(u).  The dependence  of produc- 
tivity on the unemployment  rate is deduced  from a more elaborate  con- 
23. Richard G. Lipsey, "The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of 
Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1862-1957: A Further  Analy- 
sis," Economica,  New Series,  Vol. 27 (February  1960),  pp. 1-31; G. C. Archibald,  "The 
Structure  of Excess Demand for Labor," in Edmund  S. Phelps and others, Microeco- 
nomic Foundations  of Employment  and Inflation  Theory  (Norton, 1970), pp. 212-23; 
James  Tobin, "Inflation  and Unemployment,"  Presidential  Address  before  the American 
Economic Association,  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 62 (March 1972), pp. 1-18. 
24. Ibid.,  p. 10. Robert E. Hall  727 
Figure  1. Equilibrium  Wage  and  Unemployment  Rate for a Single  City 
Wage 
Employer  equilibriuma 
)v =  3M(u) 
Wor-ker  equilibriumaio 
0  Unernploy;nent  rate 
Source: Summarized  from results of Appendix B below. 
a.  w = wage in this city; w3  = adjusted wage elsewhere; u = unemployment rate; xh(u) =  productivity 
of workers in this city. 
sideration  of the behavior  of workers  and employers  as they respond  to 
unemployment  and vacancy  rates.25  The equilibrium  in Figure  1 occurs  at 
the intersection  of the two schedules  at a wage and unemployment  rate 
that puts workers  and employers  simultaneously  in equilibrium. 
25. My use of the term "productivity"  is unconventional.  The high productivity  of 
workers  in cities with high unemployment  arises  not because  they work more effectively 
when at work but rather  because a larger  fraction of those employed  are at work pro- 
ducing output at any given time. Fewer are working  in the personnel  and training de- 
partments  and fewer  are idle overhead  workers  if the market  is slack. The reader  should 
note the contrast with cyclical changes in demand,  where tight markets  are associated 
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So far I have summarized  a theory of the equilibrium  in a single city, 
holding  conditions  elsewhere  fixed.  The theory  applies  just as well to com- 
parisons  among  cities: In equilibrium,  all cities  must have the same  effec- 
tive wage rate and the same effective  cost of labor. The discussion  up to 
now  has  shown  that  in each  market  there  is probably  only  a single  combina- 
tion of unemployment  rate and wage that is compatible  with equilibrium 
(assuming  only a single  intersection  in Figure  1). Thus the theory  implies 
that  when  all cities  are  in equilibrium,  they  will  all  have  the same  wages  and 
unemployment  rates. 
The starting  point for this analysis  was the discovery  that there  are sub- 
stantial differences  in unemployment  rates among cities, and that these 
differences  were stable  over time and therefore  probably  characteristic  of 
equilibrium.  A theory  that implies  equality  among  cities  seems  wide of the 
mark.  However,  a simple  and  realistic  extension  of the theory  seems  capa- 
ble of explaining  what  is observed.  Cities  are  not, in fact, identical,  and the 
theory  turns  out to predict  that small differences  in the underlying  deter- 
minants  of unemployment  can be magnified  into large differences  in un- 
employment  itself.  The  reason  is apparent  in Figure  1. Since  both  schedules 
slope in the same  direction,  a small upward  or downward  shift in one of 
them  will cause  a large  horizontal  shift  in the location  of their  intersection. 
In the theory  presented  in Appendix  B I treat  differences  in the attractive- 
ness of cities  to workers  and employers  as random  variables  and apply  the 
econometric  theory  of simultaneous  equations  to study  the expected  rela- 
tion between  wages  and  unemployment  that the theory  implies.  The theory 
suggests  that unless there is a sharply  negative  correlation  between  the 
attractiveness  of cities  and  the advantages  of producing  in them  apart  from 
conditions  in their  labor  markets,  the observed  set of wage-unemployment 
combinations  should  be scattered  around  a line that lies between  the two 
schedules  in Figure  1. 
It is not unreasonable  to interpret  the theory  as supporting  the view  that 
in equilibrium  some cities will have high unemployment  and high wages 
and others  low unemployment  and low wages.  This interpretation  implies 
the following  about other  conditions  in the markets:  First, vacancies  will 
probably  be lower in high-wage  cities, although  the theory  will tolerate  a 
weak  positive  relation  between  unemployment  and vacancies.  Second,  the 
rate  of  job finding  will  be lower  in high-wage  cities,  as unemployed  workers 
must  compete  with  more  of their  colleagues  for fewer  vacancies.  Third,  the Robert E. Hall  729 
rate of job filling  will be higher,  for the'  same reasor-nfewer  competing. 
employers  and more candidates  for jobs. Fourth, the quit rate will be 
lower because  of the greater  cost of finding  new  jobs. Finally,  the layoff' 
rate  will be higher,  since  employers  can replace  workers  easily  after  a tem- 
porary  decline  in demand  and therefore  will hold relatively  little overhead 
labor. Only the last of these represents  any departure  from traditional 
views of the differences  between  slack and tight labor markets.  My main 
point  here  has been  to propose  an explanation  for the persistence  over  time 
in the geographical  distribution  of slackness. 
The data available  on turnover  by cities differ  from the concepts  that 
would  be ideal according  to the theory.  I have  estimated  two basic  proba- 
bilities:  ax,  the probability  that a worker  will become  unemployed,  and  j, 
the probability  that an unemployed  worker  will find work. These are re- 
lated to, but are by no means  the same as, the sum of the quit rate and 
the layoff  rate,  on the one hand,  and  the rate  of job finding,  b, on the other. 
In the theory,  b is the fraction  of those  people  looking  for work  in a period 
who find it. It is substantially  larger  than the fraction  of the unemployed 
who find  work  because  many  of those  looking  never  become  unemployed.26 
In the SEO, a worker  who quits or is laid off and immediately  takes 
another  job does not report  a spell  of unemployment.  As Perry  suggests,  a 
reasonable  model relating  b and ,B  is the following: 
b =  s +  (  -s), 
where  s is the probability  of not becoming  unemployed  when changing 
jobs. The fractions  s, ,B,  and b all vary together:  In tighter  labor markets 
there  is a higher  probability  of finding  work  immediately,  and, failing  that, 
a higher  probability  of finding  work  in each  week  of looking.  The  response 
of the unmeasured  s, however,  means  that ,B  is a fairly  insensitive  index of 
the rate  of job finding.  The pattern  that j3  traces  across  cities  partially  con- 
ceals a more  diverse  b pattern. 
If the flow of job seekers  arises  from quits,  q, and layoffs,  y, only, the 
same  model  suggests  the  following  relation  between  separations,  q + y, and 
the probability  of becoming  unemployed,  oa: 
=  (1-  s)(q+y). 
26. George Perry  discusses  the same issue in "Unemployment  Flows," and comes to 
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High-wage,  high-unemployment  cities  have  low quit  rates,  high  layoff  rates, 
and low probabilities  of finding  jobs if separated.  As a result,  they have 
high probabilities  of unemployment,  even though their separation  rates 
may  be no different  from  those of cities  with  tight  markets.  This  is one key 
point in reconciling  the finding  that high-wage  cities  have  high  turnover  in 
the sense of frequent  unemployment  with the theory  that high wages are 
justified  in the eyes of employers  by the low turnover  of the labor force. 
In an economy  where  the traditional  pattern  of specialization  within  the 
family  still  predominates,  the theory  outlined  above  applies  mainly  to men. 
For this reason  I will discuss  the empirical  results  for men only, although 
as symmetry  between  men and women  becomes  the rule, the theory  will 
become  applicable  to women  as well. Substantial  changes  in this direction 
have taken place even since the collection  of the data used in this study. 
A Tale of Twelve  Cities 
Figure  2 shows  the relation  between  the unemployment  rates  estimated 
from  the probabilities  of entering  and leaving  unemployment  and the real 
wage  rate  in the twelve  cities  identified  in the SEO.  The real  wage  rates  in 
the cities  were  estimated  in the following  way: A regression  was estimated 
in which the left-hand  variable  was the log of the hourly  wage and the 
right-hand  variables  measured  the age, education,  race,  health,  and union 
membership  of the individual.  In addition,  dummy  variables  for the twelve 
cities  were  included.  Nominal  wages  by city were  estimated  as the antilogs 
of the coefficients  of the city dummies,  multiplied  by the base wage for 
New York. The resulting  wage  rates  are fully adjusted  for observed  differ- 
ences  in the compositions  of the labor  forces  of the cities.  They  were  then 
adjusted  for differences  in their price levels, but the data used for this 
adjustment  are inadequate.  The official  index of prices  by city, which is 
used to deflate  the wages  shown  in Figure  2, attempts  to measure  the cost 
of attaining  a specified  standard  of living  in each  city,  and  so is conceptually 
superior  to a simple fixed-weight  index; but it thereby  embodies many 
arbitrary  judgments  about how the weights  should vary among cities.27 
27. Taken from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Three  Standards  of Living  for an 
Urban  Family  of Four  Persons,  Spring  1967, Bulletin 1570-5  (1969). Robert  E. Hall  731 
Figure 2.  Real Wage Rates and Unemployment  Rates in Twelve 
Large Cities, 1966 
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Source: Derived by author from regressions  described in accompanying text. The basic city data are from 
the Survey of Economic Opportunity conducted by the Bureau of the Census, Spring 1967. 
A good deal  of dispersion  appears  in Figure  2. In addition  to that arising 
from  the unmeasured  differences  among  cities  discussed  earlier,  dispersion 
is introduced  by the techniques  of measurement  used in this study.  There 
are  statistical  errors  in the estimates  of the unemployment  rate  whose  mag- 
nitudes  are  indicated  by the standard  errors  of the city  effects  in Table  A-1, 
and similar  errors  in the estimates  of the nominal  wages.  The process  of 
deflation  introduces  further  errors  of unknown  magnitude.  Nonetheless, 
the data do suggest  a positive relation  between  the unemployment  and 
wage rates.  A regression  is a natural  way to show this, and also makes  it 
possible  to incorporate  information  about  the reliability  of the wage data 
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rate on the derived  unemployment  rate, weighted  by the inverses  of the 
standard  errors  of the wage  estimates,28  is: 
w =  $3.20 +  0.068u. 
(0.14)  (0.071) 
(The  numbers  in parentheses  here  and  in the following  equations  are  stan- 
dard  errors.)  That  is, the real  wage  rate  in cities  with,  say, 2 percent  unem- 
ployment  is about  7 cents  higher  per  hour  than  that  in cities  with 1 percent 
unemployment.  The regression  is shown  as the top line in Figure  2. Also 
shown  there  is the condition  for worker  equilibrium, 
1-u 
with  wi  set equal  to the constant  in the regression,  $3.20.  It is important  to 
note that the regression  line is steeper  than is the schedule  of worker  equi- 
librium.  I have argued  earlier  that the regression  line lies between  the two 
schedules  in Figure 1, so this finding  suggests  that the relation  between 
wages  and  unemployment  induced  by the reaction  of productivity  to condi- 
tions in the market  is the more steeply sloped of the two equilibrium 
conditions. 
The statistical  reliability  of this conclusion  arouses  understandable  con- 
cern. The size of the standard  error  of the slope coefficient  suggests  that 
an estimate  of 0.068 or greater  would be obtained  with a probability  of 
about 15 percent even if the true slope were zero. Some other results 
may reduce  this concern.  First, the official  unemployment  rate may be a 
more  satisfactory  right-hand  variable  in this regression  than is the derived 
rate,  simply  because  the official  rate  is estimated  from  a much  larger  body 
of data. The weighted  regression  of my estimated  real wage rate on the 
official  unemployment  rate  (reported  below in Table  4) is 
w =  $2.97 +  0.107u; 
(0.24)  (0.072) 
the slope is significantly  greater  than zero at better  than the 10 percent 
confidence  level. 
28. The logic of the weighting  is the following:  Sampling  errors  in the wage estimates 
are larger  for smaller  cities, so these cities should  receive  smaller  weights.  The statistical 
theory of weighted  least squares  suggests  that the weights should be inversely  propor- 
tional to the standard  errors  of the disturbances.  The inverses  of the standard  errors  of 
the coefficients  of the city dummies  in the wage  equation  provide  the appropriate  weights 
if sampling errors account for most of the disturbances  in the wage-unemployment 
regression. Robert  E. Hall  733 
Second,  the errors  in the price index may introduce  more dispersion 
than is justified  by the theoretical  improvement  of deflation.  A simple 
model  of price  differences  among  cities  would  have  untraded  goods whose 
prices  were  essentially  proportional  to local  wages,  and  traded  goods  whose 
prices  were  the same  nationwide.  In this case the prices  and wages  would 
be roughly  proportional,  but wages would vary more than prices. The 
nominal  wage would substitute  well for the real wage except for over- 
stating  its sensitivity  to the unemployment  rate. Following this logic, I 
present  the weighted  regression  of the nominal  wage  on the derived  unem- 
ployment  rate: 
w = $3.13  +  0.lllu. 
(0.18)  (0.092) 
As predicted,  the slope  is greater  than  in the first  regression.  The data and 
the regression  line appear  in Figure  3. Finally,  the most robust  relation  of 
all is between  the nominal  wage and the official  unemployment  rate: 
w =  $2.73 +  0.181u. 
(0.29)  (0.088) 
Taken  together,  these results  give reasonable  support  to the basic pre- 
diction of the theory  that wages and unemployment  rates are positively 
related  in a cross-section  of cities.29  Further,  at a somewhat  lower  level of 
statistical  confidence,  they support  the view  that the productivity  of work- 
ers is more sensitive  to the unemployment  rate than is the schedule  of 
worker  equilibrium. 
Table  4 summarizes  other  information  available  about  conditions  in the 
twelve  cities.  In addition  to the probabilities  of entering  and  leaving  unem- 
ployment  estimated  from  the SEO  and the derived  estimate  of the fraction 
of the year the average  worker  spends  unemployed,  the table reports  the 
layoff and quit rates for manufacturing  industries,  gathered  from em- 
ployers  by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  and the unemployment  rate as 
estimated  by the state employment  departments.  Unlike my results,  the 
layoff, quit, and official  unemployment  rates are not adjusted  for differ- 
ences  in the composition  of the labor forces  of the various  cities. Still, all 
29. I have experimented  with a specification  that permitted  a and ,3 to vary  for recent 
migrants.  Although the estimates  showed  the expected  relationship,  the city effects  were 
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Figure 3.  Nominal Wages and Unemployment  Rates in Twelve Large 
Cities, 1966 
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of the data seem to conform fairly well to the theory of geographical 
differences  in labor  markets  outlined  above.  Some  cities  have  tight  markets, 
notably  Chicago,  Houston, and Washington,  D.C. They have low proba- 
bilities of unemployment,  low layoff rates, high probabilities  of leaving 
unemployment,  and  low derived  and official  unemployment  rates.  Further, 
Chicago  has much the highest  quit rate of any city. On the other hand, 
some cities have slack markets-Detroit, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh,  St. 
Louis,  and  San  Francisco.  They  have  high  probabilities  of becoming  unem- 
ployed, high layoff rates (except  for Pittsburgh  and St. Louis), low quit 
rates (except  for Los Angeles and possibly  San Francisco),  low rates of 
leaving  unemployment,  and high derived  and official  unemployment  rates. Robert E. Hall  735 
Table  4. Selected  Data on Conditions  in the Labor  Markets  of 
Twelve  Large  Cities,  1966 
Percent 
Probability  Probability  Derived 
of  Manufacturing  of  fraction  Official 
becoming  leaving  of year  unem- 
unem-  Layoff  Quit  unemploy-  unem-  ployment  Real  Nominal 
Citya  ployed  rate  rate  ment  ployed  rate  wage  wage 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Washington, D.C.  0.15  0.05  0.48  18.7  0.8  2.4  $3.39  $3.39 
Houston  0.20  0.09  0.53  18.1  1.1  2.4  3.13  2.87 
Chicago  0.15  0.12  0.74  20.9  0.7  2.6  3.22  3.32 
Cleveland  0.22  0.18  0.46  13.8  1.6  2.6  3.03  3.12 
Baltimore  0.23  0.30  0.42  15.6  1.5  2.9  3.25  3.02 
Pittsburgh  0.41  0.18  0.21  12.4  3.3  3.0  3.19  3.08 
Philadelphia  0.21  0.21  0.39  14.9  1.4  3.3  3.25  3.23 
Detroit  0.32  0.42  0.42  14.9  2.1  3.3  3.71  3.65 
St. Louis  0.30  0.18  0.46  12.2  2.5  3.3  2.98  3.00 
New York  0.22  0.53  0.42  13.6  1.6  4.2  3.06  3.33 
San Francisco  0.38  0.51  0.51  12.4  3.1  4.4  3.48  3.73 
Los Angeles  0.32  0.30  0.65  12.6  2.5  4.5  3.42  3.45 
Sources: Columns (1), (4), (5)-Calculated  from Table A-1; columns (2), (3)-Employment  and Earnings, 
Vol. 15 (May 1969), Table 3, pp. 136-38, divided by 4.33 to adjust to weekly rates, except San Francisco, 
which is based on monthly data from various 1966 issues of Employment and Earnings; column  (6)- 
Manpower  Report of the President, 1970, Table D-8, pp. 284-86; columns (7) and (8)-same  as Figure 2. 
a.  Data in general are for standard metropolitan statistical areas, identified by the largest cities therein, 
but there is some variation in the areas covered by the various sources cited. 
Only in Pittsburgh  is there a substantial  discrepancy  between  my results 
and the published  data; it has the highest  frequency  of unemployment  in 
my study and yet a low layoff rate and fairly  low official  unemployment 
rate.  It is the only city where  the derived  unemployment  rate,  standardized 
for adult white males, exceeds  the official  rate, which is an unadjusted 
average  for all demographic  groups.  All of the measures  of conditions  in 
labor  markets  in Table  4 show  substantial  variation.  The  least  variable,  the 
probability  of leaving  unemployment,  is lowest  in St. Louis  at 12.2  percent 
and highest  in Chicago  at 20.9 percent,  a difference  of 71 percent.  The 
official  unemployment  rate almost doubles  over the range,  from 2.4 per- 
cent in Houston  and  Washington,  D.C., to 4.5 percent  in Los Angeles.  My 
derived  unemployment  rate shows much wider  variation-by a factor of 
more than 4-from  0.7 percent  in Chicago  to 3.1 percent  in San Fran- 
cisco and 3.3 percent  in Pittsburgh.  The estimated  probability  of becoming 
unemployed  varies  from 0.15 percent  in Chicago  and Washington,  D.C., 
to 0.38 percent  in San Francisco  and 0.41 percent  in Pittsburgh,  a ratio 
over the range of close to 3. The layoff rate in manufacturing  seems to 736  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
be in rough  agreement  with the probability  of becoming  unemployed  (ex- 
cept for Pittsburgh),  but the layoff rate has much more variation,  from 
0.05 percent  in Washington,  D.C., and 0.09 percent  in Houston to 0.51 
percent  in San Francisco  and 0.53 percent  in New York, a ratio  of high  to 
low of more  than 10. The average  level of the layoff  rate  is about  the same 
as the probability  of unemployment,  while the quit rate is considerably 
higher.  Since two other major sources  of unemployment-entrance  and 
reentrance  to the labor force-are  omitted  from the table, it is apparent 
that in a boom year like 1966 only a small fraction  of those looking for 
work  ever  become  unemployed. 
The relationship  between  the probability  of becoming  unemployed  and 
the probability  of leaving  unemployment  is surprisingly  close, as shown  in 
Figure  4. Cities with tight markets  appear  in the upper  left. Workers  in 
those cities have low probabilities  of becoming  unemployed,  because  lay- 
offs are infrequent  and changing  jobs without becoming  unemployed  is 
Figure 4.  Weekly Probabilities of Entering and Leaving Unemployment, 
Twelve Large Cities, 1966 
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Table 5.  Weekly Layoff Rate in Manufacturing  in Twelve Large Cities, 
1962, 1966, and 1970 
Percent 
Year 
City  1962  1966  1970 
Baltimore  0.48  0.30  0.37 
Chicago  n.a.  0.12  0.25 
Cleveland  n.a.  0.18  0.39 
Detroit  n.a.  0.42  0.67 
Houston  n.a.  0.09  0.09 
Los Angeles  0.39  0.30  n.a. 
New York  0.67  0.53  0.69 
Philadelphia  n.a.  0.21  0.39 
Pittsburgh  n.a.  0.18  0.39 
St. Louis  0.39  0.18  0.32 
San Francisco  0.76  0.51  n.a. 
Washington,  D.C.  0.07  0.05  0.05 
Sources: Employment  and Earnings, various May issues. Data are adjusted to weekly rates by dividing 
by 4.33. Data for New York for all years and for Washington in 1966 and 1970 are for the standard metro- 
politan statistical area. 
n.a.  Not available. 
easy.  Once  unemployed,  they are  able  to find  work  quickly.  Conditions  are 
just the opposite  in the cities at the lower  right  of Figure  4. 
The equilibrium  theory suggests  that employers  react  to differences  in 
conditions  in labor  markets  through  the adjustment  of their  policies  of hir- 
ing and laying off. In slack  markets,  an employer  can afford  an unstable 
policy in which most of a fluctuation  in demand  can be met by a corre- 
sponding  change  in his labor force,  since a large  fraction  of those laid off 
will still  be available  for recall  even after  a month  or two, and,  in any case, 
new  hiring  is easy  because  of the  large  pool of unemployed  workers.  In tight 
markets,  laid-off  workers  are less likely  to be available  for recall  and new 
hires  more  difficult,  so an employer  is induced  to stabilize  his labor  force  by 
holding  idle  workers  during  fluctuations  in his output.  The  large  differences 
among  the layoff  rates  of the twelve  cities  of the study  are  quite  surprising. 
Apparently  the relation  suggested  by the theory  is quite strong.  Further, 
just as the pattern  of unemployment  rates  is stable  over  time,  so is the pat- 
tern  of layoff  rates.  Table  5 presents  the published  rates  for manufacturing 
industries,  again at weekly  rates, for 1962, 1966, and the recession  year, 
1970. The cities with low layoff rates in 1966-Chicago, Houston, and 738  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
Washington,  D.C.-were  low in 1970,  as well; Washington  (the only one 
of the three  for which  data are available)  was also low in 1962. 
IMPLICATIONS  OF THE STUDY  OF TWELVE CITIES FOR REGIONAL 
MANPOWER  POLICIES 
The theory I have proposed  suggests  that relatively  subtle differences 
among  cities can induce  fairly  large  differences  in the conditions  in their 
labor  markets,  especially  in layoff  and unemployment  rates.  The data ap- 
pear  to be consistent  with the theory  and to discredit  its main  competitor, 
the theory of perpetual  disequilibrium  caused by transitory  shifts in de- 
mand  among  cities.30  The  theory  has  plain  implications  about  the  potential 
impact of regional  manpower  policies. I distinguish  two main types of 
policies  intended  to deal  with  the problem  of slack  labor  markets  in certain 
geographical  areas:  those that attempt  to increase  the demand  for labor 
by subsidizing  employers  in depressed  areas and those that attempt  to 
decrease  the supply  of labor  by subsidizing  the relocation  of workers  from 
slack  to tight  markets.  The  first  kind  is typified  by the Area  Redevelopment 
Act of 1961  and the second  by more recent  experimental  programs  of the 
Department  of Labor.  An expansion  of the latter  programs  has been  advo- 
cated  by Charles  Holt and his colleagues  at the Urban  Institute  as part of 
their proposal  for a comprehensive  revision  and enlargement  of federal 
manpower  programs.3' 
Subsidies  to employers  in depressed  areas  can take a variety  of forms- 
tax credits  or rebates,  provision  of free  services  such  as highways,  and so 
forth-but these can be incorporated  at least roughly  in the theory  as an 
upward  shift in the schedule  of employer  equilibrium  in Figure 1. If that 
schedule  is steeper  than the one for worker  equilibrium,  then the intersec- 
tion shifts  in the direction  of lower  wages  and  less unemployment.  Produc- 
tivity  falls  by more  than the amount  of the subsidy,  but on the other  hand 
each worker  is employed  a larger  fraction  of the year. If the schedule  for 
employers  is less steep  than  the one for workers,  just the opposite  happens: 
Wages  and unemployment  rates  rise and productivity  rises by more than 
30. That is, discredit  it as a unitary  explanation  of the geographical  pattern  of unem- 
ployment. Obviously,  transitory  shifts in demand  cause perturbations  around  the equi- 
librium  described  by my theory. In this sense, the two theories  are complementary. 
31. Charles  C. Holt and others, "Manpower  Proposals for Phase III," in Brookings 
Papers  on Economic  Activity  (3:1971), pp. 712-22. Robert E. Hall  739 
the amount  of the subsidy.  In both cases  the equilibrating  mechanisms  of 
the market  defeat  the hope that such policies  will decrease  unemployment 
and increase  wages  simultaneously.32 
Policies  for inducing  workers  to move from  slack  markets  to tight  mar- 
kets  with  relocation  allowances  are  not as easy  to incorporate  in the theory. 
One way they might operate  in practice  is simply  to make  low-unemploy- 
ment  regions  more  attractive  to workers.  This  can be portrayed  as a down- 
ward shift in the schedule of worker  equilibrium  in Figure 1 and has 
exactly  the same effect  as the upward  shift in the other  schedule  just dis- 
cussed.  Either  unemployment  and wages fall to even lower levels in the 
low-unemployment  region,  or they both rise.  Only  in the second  case does 
the economy  move toward  the equalization  of unemployment  differentials 
that presumably  is the goal of programs  that subsidize  relocation  from 
high-  to low-unemployment  areas. 
My main point is that if the pattern  of regional  differences  is in fact 
characteristic  of equilibrium,  the change  in the equilibrium  brought  about 
by the policies  may  well  be perverse.  An understanding  of the nature  of the 
mechanism  determining  regional  differences  in economic  activity  is essen- 
tial to the formulation  of appropriate  regional  policies. I do not believe 
that the simple  theory  of disequilibrium,  which  seems  to underlie  the two 
kinds of policies considered  here, is a satisfactory  basis by itself for de- 
signing  programs. 
The Social Costs  and  Benefits  of Unemployment 
Every  contemporary  account  of unemployment  grants  the usefulness  of 
a certain  level of unemployment.  Without  a careful  process  of looking  for 
work on the part of prospective  employees,  the matching  of jobs and 
workers  that is an essential  feature  of the efficient  operation  of the labor 
market  would  not take place.  Most discussions  seem  to assume,  however, 
that the private  interests  of individual  unemployed  workers  coincide  with 
the interests  of the society  as a whole,  that there  are  no external  benefits  or 
costs associated  with their individual  decisions.  In its extreme  form, this 
view leads to the belief that the level of unemployment  in a competitive 
economy  in equilibrium  is optimal.  The theory  of turnover  suggests,  on the 
32. Joseph Stiglitz, in "Alternative  Theories,"  has made much the same point with 
regard  to policies for subsidizing  urban  employment  in developing  countries, 740  Brookings PaDers on Economic Activity. 3:1972 
contiary,  that an important  externality  operates  through  unemployment. 
Conditions  in the labor market  affect the productivity  of workers,  and 
these conditions  are affected  by the decisions  of individuals.  An unem- 
ployed  worker  who takes a job imposes  a cost on the society  by reducing 
the unemployment  rate and thereby  decreasing  the productivity  of the 
economy.  He receives  a benefit  in the form of the wage he earns.  The net 
social  benefit  or cost is the difference  between  the two. Social  efficiency  is 
achieved  when the marginal  value of putting  another  person  to work is 
exactly  equal to the social cost of the reduction  in productivity  brought 
about as a consequence  of the tightening  of the labor  market.  I will argue 
that part  of the cost is a true  externality,  not reflected  by any private  cost, 
so there is no reason to expect an efficient  level of unemployment  in a 
purely  competitive  economy.33 
The notion of an optimal amount of excess capacity-of  both labor 
and capital-within a firm  is a familiar  one. Occasional  idleness  is a sign 
of efficiency,  since it means that someone is available  for high-priority 
tasks that may arise  unexpectedly.  I will argue  here that the unemployed 
perform  a similar  function  in the aggregate  economy.  The crucial  differ- 
ence is that in the firm,  private  and social costs and benefits  coincide  for 
decisions  about the allocation  of individual  workers,  so the management 
should choose an efficient  level of excess labor, while in the aggregate 
economy,  the decision-making  agents face private  costs that differ  from 
the social costs. The essence  of my argument  is that the unemployed  per- 
form  a socially  useful  function  for which  they are not necessarily  compen- 
sated,  and  that  employers  are  not necessarily  rewarded  enough  (or charged 
enough)  for putting  the unemployed  to work. 
Why is it necessary  to maintain  a labor reserve  outside  the firm  and to 
require  individual  workers  to finance  periods  of unemployment  at least in 
part from their own funds?  The first reaction  of most economists  to the 
suggestion  of an externality  is to look for economic  institutions  that could 
make externalities  of single individuals  internal  to a group. Many such 
institutions  do in fact exist; firms  that supply  temporary  clerical  help are 
33. In "Inflation  and Unemployment,"  James  Tobin has made  the general  point that 
externalities  in the process  of job search  invalidate  the presumption  that the competitive 
equilibrium  is efficient.  He mentions  externalities  of a sort not dealt with here but does 
not consider the relation between the level of unemployment  and productivity  that is 
central  to my argument. Robert E. Hall  741 
a clear  example.  But  there  is a fundamental  limitation  to the scope  of these 
institutions.  At whatever  level they operate,  they cannot take charge of 
all of the reserve  of workers  available  for employment,  because  part  of the 
reserve  consists of workers  from the outside.  For a firm,  the availability 
of workers  laid off from other firms  in the same industry  makes it un- 
desirable  to meet  all fluctuations  in labor  requirements  through  an internal 
reserve.  Similarly,  the availability  of workers  from other  industries  limits 
the scope  of an institution  that  maintains  an internal  reserve  within  a single 
industry,  although  industrial  unions  do have this role to a certain  extent. 
Since no rigid boundaries  restrict  the occupational,  industrial,  and geo- 
graphic  mobility  of labor,  private  institutions  are incapable  of making  the 
costs of maintaining  a reserve  of workers  fully internal  and private. 
Not all of the returns  to unemployment  are  social  rather  than  individual. 
To the extent  that the unemployed  search  actively  for  jobs, they may cap- 
ture some of the benefits  of unemployment  for themselves  in the form of 
better  jobs. In the extreme,  all of the benefits  of unemployment  described 
above could accrue  to the individual.  I find this implausible  because  it 
suggests  that  the unemployed  consistently  improve  their  prospects  by wait- 
ing for the right  job, whereas  in fact many  of the unemployed  find  waiting 
to be a pure  burden  because  they expect  to return  to their  old  jobs or ones 
just like them.  The point remains,  however,  that some workers  can make 
good use of their time while unemployed.  Some fraction of the social 
return  to unemployment  calculated  in the next section is probably  cap- 
tured  by the individual  unemployed  worker. 
Social efficiency  requires  that a system  of taxes be imposed  to account 
for the externality  associated  with unemployment  by making  private  costs 
and benefits,  after  taxes, equal  the social costs and benefits.  This requires 
a subsidy for unemployed  workers,  to compensate  them for the social 
contribution  they make by being available  immediately  for work, and a 
tax on employers  for the social  cost of withdrawing  workers  from  the pool 
of idle workers. 
The magnitude  of the compensation  and corresponding  tax depends  on 
the fraction  of the benefits  of unemployment  that do not accrue  to the in- 
dividual.  It is conceivable  that  the fraction  is large  and  that  social  efficiency 
requires  fairly generous  unemployment  compensation,  but no empirical 
evidence  is available  to support  this view. Martin  Feldstein  has recently 
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found  that  they  are  as high  as 90 percent  of previous  wages  for some  work- 
ers  in some states.34  Current  knowledge  cannot  answer  the question  about 
the efficiency  of these  high rates.  My main  point is that there  is no reason 
to believe  that  unemployment  compensation  is invariably  a source  of ineffi- 
ciency. I contrast  my view with what I believe  is the conventional  view 
among  economists  that unemployment  compensation  is insurance  against 
the risk  of unemployment,  and that  the problem  with  it as insurance  is the 
substantial  moral hazard  posed by the individual's  control over his own 
unemployment.35 
Are High Turnover  and  High Unemployment  Inevitable? 
Many economists  are reluctant  to accept  the conclusion  that high turn- 
over  and  high  unemployment  are  inevitable  in view  of the very  low rates  of 
turnover  and unemployment  found in other highly developed  countries, 
especially  West Germany  and Japan. One of the contributions  of this 
paper  is to identify  comparable  examples  from  the U.S. economy:  Chicago 
has far less new unemployment  each week  than the national  average,  and 
a substantially  lower overall  unemployment  rate. Advocates  of the view 
that high  unemployment  is inevitable  often  dismiss  the evidence  from  West 
Germany  and  Japan  on the grounds  that  these  conservative  societies  induce 
much greater  personal  stability  among  their  members  than does the more 
open,  liberal  society  of the United States.  One could not equally  plausibly 
argue the irrelevance  of the evidence from the most American  of all 
American  cities,  Chicago. 
The theory of turnover  presented  at the beginning  of the paper and 
refined  through  the comparison  of the twelve  large  cities  has implications 
for the aggregate  economy.  In the absence  of international  migration,  labor 
mobility  does not establish  an aggregate  connection  between  unemploy- 
ment and wages of the sort proposed  earlier.  Within  a country,  the geo- 
graphical  pattern  of wage diflerentials  must match the pattern  of differ- 
entials  in unemployment  rates,  but nothing  discussed  so far  determines  the 
overall  level of wages  (w in my algebraic  exposition).  On the other  hand, 
the connection  between  unemployment  and wage rates arising  from the 
lower productivity  of workers  in tight markets  does operate  at the aggre- 
34. "Lowering  the Permanent  Rate of Unemployment." 
35. See, for example, Edmund S. Phelps, Inflation  and Unemployment:  The Cost- 
Benefit  Approach  to Monetary  Planning  (Norton, 1972),  pp. 97-99. Robert  E. Hall  743 
gate level (the value of x is set by the relation  between  prices  and costs). 
Consequently,  the aggregate  economy  faces a choice between  tight labor 
markets  and lower  wages on the one hand, and slack  markets  and higher 
wages, on the other.  The model can be closed in a variety  of ways. The 
crude  Keynesian  would  take  the wage  rate  as fixed  and  given.  The  classical 
economist  would take a particular  unemployment  rate as an indicator  of 
market  clearing.  The modern  economist  would introduce  a complex  ad- 
justment  process  linking  the wage level to the past history  of unemploy- 
ment. If the adjustment  process  can be summarized  by a stable  long-run 
Phillips  curve,  the choices available  are indexed  by the rate of inflation: 
Tight  markets  and low real  wage  levels  will be accompanied  by high rates 
of inflation,  and vice versa. In the limiting  case of a vertical  long-run 
Phillips  curve, only a single unemployment  rate, the natural  rate, can be 
sustained  indefinitely  and  it implies  a certain  set of conditions  in the labor 
market.  Nothing  in the theory  of turnover  provides  grounds  for optimism 
about improving  the performance  of the labor market  through  aggregate 
expansionary  policy  by itself. 
What would be a socially efficient  policy for labor markets?  I have 
neither  the theory  nor the empirical  results  to deal with this question  for 
the contemporary  American  economy  beyond  my general  remarks  on the 
social costs and benefits  of unemployment.  I can, however,  say something 
about  a mythical  economy.  Suppose  that  no artificial  factors  barred  mobil- 
ity in the labor market  and that all workers  were effectively  identical,  so 
that  none of the serious  problems  of the unequal  distribution  of unemploy- 
ment among  demographic  groups  existed.  Suppose  further  that the aggre- 
gate relation  between  productivity  and  unemployment  in the economy  was 
the following: 
w =  $3.15 + 0.04u. 
To determine  the hourly  social return  to unemployment  in this economy, 
suppose  that there  are  N manhours  available  in the labor  force  of which U 
are unemployed.  Then u =  100 U/N. Total output  is the product  of the 
number  of manhours  employed,  N -  U, and the productivity  of each, w: 
X =  (N  -  U)w. 
Now the net marginal  contribution  of one more  unemployed  worker  is the 
derivative  of X with respect  to U: 
dX  dw 
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The first term is the social benefit  associated  with the increased  produc- 
tivity  of the remaining  employed  workers  and the second  is the social and 
private  cost of the reduction  in employment.  Since 
w =  $3.15 +  0.04u 
=  $3.15+0.04  ??0U  N' 
then 
dw_  $4.00 
dU  N' 
and the marginal  social benefit  of unemployment  is 
$400N  U 
At, say, 2 percent  unemployment,  the marginal  social  benefit  of unemploy- 
ment  is $3.92  per  hour,  while  the marginal  social  and  individual  cost is only 
$3.23  per  hour.  In the mythical  economy,  there  is too little  unemployment! 
In such an economy the reserve  of workers  is a scarce  resource  that is 
inappropriately  rationed because employers  are not charged for with- 
drawing  a worker  from  the pool. Similarly,  workers  do not face  the appro- 
priate incentive  to remain  unemployed.  The mythical  economy needs a 
policy that increases  the unemployment  rate to the point of equality  of 
marginal  social  costs and benefits. 
The mythical  economy  may bear  some slight  resemblance  to the market 
for adult  white  males  in the United  States  but surely  not to the  labor  market 
as a whole. The markets  in the United States for blacks, women, and 
youths seem to be separated  from the market  for adult white males by 
artificial  barriers.  The less permeable  these  barriers,  the more  the markets 
need  to be analyzed  separately.  Markets  for adult  white  males  may  well be 
chronically  tight, with unemployment  rates  below  the efficient  level, while 
those  for blacks,  women,  and  youths  are  chronically  slack  with  inefficiently 
high unemployment.  This conclusion  is certainly  consistent  with the em- 
pirical  evidence  on the turnover  of individual  workers  presented  earlier  in 
the paper.  It has the important  implication  that  the social  cost of removing 
one worker  from the slack market  is lower  than the wage in that market 
while the social benefit  of adding  a worker  to the tight market  is greater 
than the wage  there,  so the wage differential  may substantially  understate 
the social benefits  of moving workers  across the barrier.  Programs  for 
putting  disadvantaged  workers  into good  jobs, such as those discussed  in Robert  E. Hall  745 
the later sections  of my previous  paper,  may have social benefits  beyond 
the private  benefits  to the individuals  in the programs. 
What,  then,  of West  Germany,  Japan,  and  Chicago?  There  are  both costs 
and benefits  to tight  labor  markets.  Turnover  is a sign of efficiency  as well 
as a source  of individual  distress.  The  existence  of economies  with  low turn- 
over and unemployment  rates suggests  the feasibility  but not necessarily 
the desirability  of achieving  similar  rates  in the United States.  The present 
state of knowledge  does not justify a single-minded  policy of tightening 
labor  markets  without  attending  to the fundamental  structural  problems  ot 
lack of opportunity  for many  groups  in the labor  force. 
APPENDIX  A 
Estimation  of the Frequency  and 
Duration  of Unemployment 
THE  FREQUENCY  OF UNEMPLOYMENT  is measured by the probability, a, 
that a worker  who is not unemployed  in one week  will  become  unemployed 
in the next;  the duration  of unemployment  is inversely  proportional  to the 
probability,  ,B,  that an unemployed  worker  will no longer  be unemployed 
in the next  week.  Neither  of these  probabilities  depends  on the past  history 
of the individual.  Thus,  at the level of the individual,  the model  is a simple 
Markov  model. This study differs  from previous  applications  of Markov 
models to flows in the labor market'  in the important  respect  that the 
transition  probabilities  are functions  of individual  characteristics.2 
Natural  estimates  of a and ,B  are the following: 
number  of times  unemployment  began 
number  of times unemployment  could have begun 
1. For  example, Martin David  and Toshiyuki Otsuki, "Forecasting Short-run 
Variation in Labor Market Activity," Review of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 50 
(February  1968), pp. 68-77. 
2. Since data are not available on the lengths of individual  spells, nothing can be 
done here  about the dependence  of ,  on the length of the spell. George  Perry  has treated 
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and 
A  _  number  of times  unemployment  ended 
A  number  of times unemployment  could have ended' 
Except  for spells  that began  before  the year  began,  or ended  after  the year 
ended,  the numerators  of these  two estimators  are both equal  to the num- 
ber of spells.  Further  (again  except  for the case of overlap),  the denomi- 
nator of A is observed  directly  as the number  of weeks  of unemployment 
and the denominator  of d can be obtained  by subtracting  the number  of 
weeks of unemployment  from 52; thus, except  for beginning  and ending 
effects,  these estimators  can be calculated  directly  from  the data. 
Now 
S -1  <  E ?  S, 
S -1  <  B <S  , 
W-1?  M  W 
and 
51-W  <  N5  <52-W; 
so 
52-  W_  51 -  W 
and 
S-1  A  S 
w  w- 
where 
S  =  the number of spells 
W = the number  of weeks  of unemployment 
E = the number  of times  unemployment  ended 
B = the number  of times  it began 
M = the number  of times  unemployment  could have ended 
N =  the number  of times  it could have begun. 
Since the probability  of unemployment  is well below one-half,  the best 
single  pair of estimators  is probably  that based  on the assumption  that no 
spell of unemployment  overlaps  the beginning  or end of the year: 
E=  B=  S,M=  W,andN=  51-  W. 
The resulting estimators, a*  =  S/(51  -  W) and A* -S/W,  lie within the Robert E. Hall  747 
bounds  just given  and  are  the ones  used  in this study.  The  following  specifi- 
cations  were  used for the probabilities: 
ex-. 
1 +  ex a 
and 
ex.7 
A 1 +e7 
where  x is the vector of the individual's  characteristics  and a and 7 are 
vectors  of parameters  to be estimated.  Estimates  were  made  by the method 
of maximum  likelihood. 
The characteristics,  x, used  in this study  measure  the race, number  and 
ages of children,  wage (imputed  according  to a formula  similar  to that in 
my study of labor supply3),  income (including the value of the time of the 
worker,  but not his actual  earnings),  age, marital  status,  city of residence, 
and type of employment  (private  wage or salary, government,  self-em- 
ployed, and unpaid  family  employment).  The variables  have the form of 
dummy  variables  for the characteristics  that are categorical;  for example, 
X2 =  1 for blacks and 0 for whites. For each continuous  characteristic 
(wage,  income,  or age),  x consists  of a set of variables  that,  when  weighted 
by the estimated  coefficients,  form a continuous,  piecewise  linear  function 
of the characteristic.  Each coefficient  bi or -Ti  should be interpreted  as 
approximately  the proportional  change  in the corresponding  probability 
associated  with xi =  1 rather  than xi = 0. Thus 62  is approximately  the 
proportion  by which  the probability  that a black  will become  unemployed 
exceeds  the probability  that a white will become  unemployed.  The exact 
interpretation  of these  coefficients  is obtained  by evaluating  the expressions 
just given. 
Data for this study  were  obtained  from  the Survey  of Economic  Oppor- 
tunity  (SEO),  conducted  by the U.S. Bureau  of the Census  in the spring  of 
1967,  and  refer  to 1966  experience.  All individuals  living  in the twelve  large 
standard  metropolitan  statistical  areas  identified  in the SEO  were  included, 
except  those unable  to work,  those employed  in the construction  industry 
or the armed  forces, and those for whom data on unemployment  were 
3. "Wages, Income, and Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor Force," in Harold W. 
Watts and Glen G. Cain, Income  Maintenance  and  Labor  Supply:  Econometric  Studies, 
Monograph  Series, University  of Wisconsin,  Institute for Research  on Poverty, forth- 
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missing.  Separate  results  were obtained  for men and for women.  The co- 
efficients  together  with their estimated  standard  errors  are presented  in 
Tables  A-1 and  A-2. These  estimates  were  based  on 9,766  men and 12,287 
women, contributing  432,974 and 567,728 weekly observations,  respec- 
tively,  to the estimation  of a, and 13,990  and 12,040  observations  to the 
estimation  of A. 
Table A-1.  Coefficients for Weekly Probabilities of  Entering and 
Leaving Unemployment for Men,  by Selected  Characteristics, 1966 
Parameter  of  Parameter  of 
probability  of becoming  probability  of leaving 
Characteristic  unemployed,  a  unemployment,  y 
Constant  -6.13  -1.85 
(0.14)  (0.15) 
Color 
Black  0.56  -0.32 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
White  0  0 
Children 
None  0.19  0.16 
(0.10)  (0.11) 
Preschool  only  0  0 
School age only  0.14  0.00 
(0.11)  (0.13) 
Both ages  0.17  0.11 
(0.11)  (0.12) 
City of residence 
Baltimore  0.07  0.17 
(0.12)  (0.13) 
Chicago  -0.37  0.52 
(0.11)  (0.13) 
Cleveland  0.03  0.02 
(0.16)  (0.17) 
Detroit  0.36  0.09 
(0.10)  (0.12) 
Houston  -0.12  0.34 
(0.15)  (0.17) 
Los Angeles  0.36  -0.08 
(0.09)  (0.09) 
New York  0  0 
Philadelphia  -0.02  0.11 
(0.12)  (0.13) 
Pittsburgh  0.63  -0.11 
(0.15)  (0.16) Robert  E. Hall  749 
Table A-1 (Continued) 
Parameter  of  Parameter  of 
probability  of becoming  probability  of leaving 
Characteristic  unemnployed,  a  unemployment,  y 
St. Louis  0.32  -0.12 
(0.14)  (0.16) 
San Francisco  0.55  -0.11 
(0.10)  (0.11) 
Washington,  D.C.  -0.40  0.38 
(0.13)  (0.14) 
Wage  rate per hour (dollars) 
0  0.50  0.15 
(0.82)  (0.96) 
1.50  0.24  -0.24 
(0.14)  (0.16) 
2.00  0.12  -0.10 
(0.13)  (0.14) 
3.00  0  0 
4.00  -0.28  -0.11 
(0.26)  (0.34) 
10.00  -16.46  6.19 
(9.44)  (12.53) 
Annual family income per adult (dollars) 
0  -1.30  0.45 
(0.46)  (0.49) 
2,00  -0.05  0.02 
(0.11)  (0.12) 
4,000  0  0 
7,000  -0.40  -0.37 
(0.18)  (0.20) 
10,000  0.20  -0.34 
(0.40)  (0.53) 
40,000  -4.75  -9.60 
(6.27)  (14.58) 
Age (years) 
15  -0.40  0.83 
(0.15)  (0.17) 
22  0.40  0.23 
(0.12)  (0.14) 
30  0  0 
45  -0.30  0.14 
(0.12)  (0.13) 
65  -0.33  -0.09 
(0.13)  (0.14) 
98  -4.61  1.22 
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Table  A-1 (Continued) 
Parameter  of  Parameter  of 
probability  of becoming  probability  of leaving 
Characteristic  unemployed,  a  unemployment,  y 
Type of worker 
Not reported  -0.62  -0.99 
(0.09)  (0.09) 
Private  wage or salary  0  0 
Government  -0.77  -0.12 
(0.14)  (0.11) 
Self-employed 
Salaried  0.13  1.00 
(0.36)  (0.53) 
Not salaried  -0.79  0.19 
(0.18)  (0.20) 
Marital  status 
Married  0  0 
Not married  0.60  -0.14 
(0.08)  (0.08) 
Source: Derived from the Survey of Economic Opportunity conducted by U.S.  Bureau of the Census, 
Spring 1967. The data cover twelve standard metropolitan statistical areas, identified by the largest cities 
under "City of residence." The numbers in parentheses  are estimated standard errors. 
Table A-2. Coefficients  for Weekly  Probabilities  of Entering  and Leaving 
Unemployment  for Women,  by Selected  Characteristics,  1966 
Parameter  of  Parameter  of 
probability  of becoming  probability  of leaving 
Characteristic  unemployed,  a  unemployment,  y 
Constant  -7.45  -1.02 
(0.27)  (0.32) 
Color 
Black  0.75  -0.40 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
White  0  0 
Children 
None  0.03  0.01 
(0.09)  (0.10) 
Preschool  only  0  0 
School age only  -0.03  0.01 
(0.10)  (0.12) 
Both ages  -0.05  0.32 
(0.11)  (0.12) 
City of residence 
Baltimore  -0.35  0.06 
(0.14)  (0.15) Robert E. Hall  751 
Table A-2 (Continued) 
Parameter  of  Parameter  of 
probability  of becoming  probability  of leaving 
Characteristic  unemployed,  a  unemployment,  y 
City of residence  (cont.) 
Chicago  -0.43  0.07 
(0.11)  (0.13) 
Cleveland  0.27  -0.10 
(0.14)  (0.16) 
Detroit  0.11  -0.37 
(0.11)  (0.12) 
Houston  0.07  0.44 
(0.15)  (0.18) 
Los Angeles  0.19  -0.13 
(0.09)  (0.10) 
New York  0  0 
Philadelphia  -0.04  -0.25 
(0.11)  (0.12) 
Pittsburgh  0.15  -0.32 
(0.19)  (0.20) 
St. Louis  0.36  -0.29 
(0.14)  (0.16) 
San Francisco  0.37  -0.20 
(0.10)  (0.11) 
Washington,  D.C.  -0.47  0.17 
(0.12)  (0.13) 
Wage  rate per hour (dollars) 
0  -1.19  -1.23 
(0.46)  (0.53) 
1.50  0.31  -0.91 
(0.23)  (0.28) 
2.00  0.49  -1.09 
(0.26)  (0.30) 
3.00  0  0 
4.00  -0.46  -1.61 
(0.86)  (0.93) 
10.00  16.97  1.00 
(3.79)  (3.61) 
Annual family income per adult (dollars) 
0  -0.45  0.43 
(0.37)  (0.42) 
2,000  0.22  0.00 
(0.11)  (0.12) 
4,000  0  0 
7,000  -0.09  -0.43 
(0.19)  (0.22) 
10,000  -2.17  -0.89 
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Table  A-2 (Continued) 
Parameter  of  Parameter  of 
probability  of becoming  probability  of leaving 
Characteristic  unemployed,  a  unemployment,  y 
Income  (dollars)  (cont.) 
40,000  6.71  -0.52 
(1.16)  (1.25) 
Age (years) 
15  -0.04  0.49 
(0.14)  (0.16) 
22  0.51  0.04 
(0.12)  (0.13) 
30  0  0 
45  -0.30  -0.06 
(0.12)  (0.14) 
65  -0.44  -0.19 
(0.15)  (0.16) 
98  -4.74  0.13 
(1.07)  (1.30) 
Type of worker 
Not reported  0  0 
Private  wage or salary  1.22  0.38 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
Government  0.45  0.30 
(0.11)  (0.12) 
Self-employed 
Salaried  2.51  0.28 
(0.39)  (0.44) 
Not salaried  0.77  0.60 
(0.27)  (0.30) 
Marital  status 
Married  0  0 
Not married  0.22  -0.06 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
Sources: Same as Table A-1. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors. Robert E. Hall  753 
APPENDIX  B 
Geographical  Differences  in Unemployment, 
Turnover,  and Wage Rates* 
THE  THEORY  STARTS  in the following  way: I consider  the behavior  of 
workers  and  employers  in a single  city.  Both  may  consider  moving  to other 
cities,  workers  because  of higher  wages  or lower  unemployment  rates,  em- 
ployers  because  of lower  wages  or more  productive  workers.  I will assume 
that unemployed  workers  follow reasonable  strategies  in trying to find 
work,  and that, as a result,  there  is a probability,  b, of finding  work  each 
week. To some extent,  this probability  is within  the control  of the unem- 
ployed  worker,  although  this should  not be taken  to mean  that unemploy- 
ment  is somehow  voluntary.  I will assume  that  b is a stable  function  of two 
measures  of conditions  in the market,  the unemployment  rate, u, and the 
vacancy  rate, v: 
b =  B(u, v). 
Similarly,  employers  trying  to fill  jobs are assumed  to have a probability, 
r, of filling  a given  vacancy  each  week,  again  assumed  to be a function  of 
u and v: 
r =  R(u, v). 
In addition,  each worker  is assumed  to have a probability,  q, of quitting 
each week, while employers  have a probability,  y, of laying off a given 
worker  each  week.  In equilibrium,  the unemployment  rate  in this system  is 
u-  q+y 
q +yj+,b 
and the vacancy  rate  is 
=  qq+y 
q +  y +  r 
* My debt to the thinking  of Charles  C. Holt will be apparent  to all readers  of this 
appendix. See appendix of Charles C. Holt and others, The Unemployment-Inflation 
Dilemma:  A Manpower  Solution  (Urban Institute,  1971),  pp. 94-102. 754  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
The effective  wage  elsewhere  in the economy  is assumed  to be fixed  exoge- 
nously  at the level  w. In order  that  workers  in this city have  no inducement 
to emigrate,  and  that  workers  elsewhere  have  no inducement  to immigrate, 
effective  wages  here and elsewhere  must be equal: 
(1  -  u)w  =  w. 
I will refer  to this as the condition  for worker  equilibrium. 
The similar  condition  for employer  equilibrium  is that effective  labor 
costs here  and  elsewhere  must  be equal.  I assume  that the net productivity, 
f(r,  q), of workers  in a given  labor  market  depends  on the cost of recruiting, 
as measured  by the probability  of filling  a job, r, and on the quit rate,  q. 
Net productivity  is higher  when  r is higher,  since  in that case it is cheaper 
to replace  workers  who have  quit  and  also  possible  to lay off  workers  in the 
event of a brief reduction  in demand.  If unit labor cost elsewhere  is x, 
the equilibrium  condition  for employers  is 
w 
f(r,  q)  X. 
Quits and layoffs depend on conditions  in the market.  I will assume 
that the quit rate  depends  on the cost of finding  new work: 
q =  Q(b); 
and that the layoff  rate depends  on the cost of filling  jobs: 
y =  Y(r). 
In principle,  y should  also depend  on the quit rate, but nothing  essential 
is lost by making  this simpler  assumption. 
Since the quit and layoff rates depend  on the rates of job finding  and 
job filling,  which  in turn  depend  on the underlying  measures  of conditions, 
u and v, it is possible  to write  the unemployment  rate  as a function  of itself 
and the vacancy  rate: 
U  Q(B(u, v)) +  y(R(u, v)) 
Q(B(u, v)) +  y(R(u, v)) +  B(u, v) 
This can be solved  to get v as a function  of u: 
v =  g(u). 
The function  g(u) tells what vacancy  rate is necessary  to achieve  the quit 
rate,  layoff  rate,  and  rate  ofjob finding  that  are  consistent  with  the specified 
unemployment  rate, u. It may slope upward  or downward.  In general,  a Robert E. Hall  755 
higher  unemployment  rate is associated  with a lower quit rate, a higher 
layoff  rate, and a lower  rate of job finding.  If the first  of these dominates 
the other  two, a higher  level of vacancies  will be necessary  to balance  a 
higher  employment  rate. Otherwise,  vacancies  will be lower when unem- 
ployment  is higher. 
The equilibrium  condition  for employers  can now be written  in terms  of 
the wage level and the unemployment  rate: 
w 
f(R(u,  g(u))),  Q(B(u, g(u))) 
Unless the quit rate is very sensitive  to the rate of job finding,  R(u,  g(u)) 
will be an increasing  function  of u (recruiting  is easier  in a market  with 
higher  unemployment)  and Q(B(u, g(u))) wil be a decreasing  function  of 
u (since  jobs are harder  to find when unemployment  is higher).  Both of 
these considerations  make workers  more productive  when the unemploy- 
ment rate is higher.  This relation  can be summarized  by a function, 
h(u) = f(R(u,  g(U))), Q(B(u, g(u))), 
which is increasing in u. 
Full equilibrium  in the market requires that worker and employer 
equilibrium  hold together.  In the diagram  of Figure 1, this takes place at 
the intersection  of the schedules 
w =  1 _  and  w =  xh(u). 
Differences  among  Cities 
Suppose  first  that cities  differ  in their  attractiveness  to workers,  and  that 
this difference  can be measured  by a variable,  a, which enters  the equi- 
librium  condition  for workers  in the following  way: 
(1 -  u)w =  w-  a. 
Workers  will  not leave  an attractive  city with  a high  value  of a even  though 
the effective  wage there  is lower  than elsewhere.  This is a simple  applica- 
tion of the principle  of equalizing  differences.  Similarly,  suppose  that  cities 
differ  in productivity  for reasons  apart  from  conditions  in their  labor  mar- 
kets. I define  a measure,  z, which  shifts  the net productivity  of workers  so 
as to make  the equilibrium  of employers  the following: 
w =  [h(u) +  z]x. 756  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
Differences  in climate  among  cities  are  likely  to affect  both their  attractive- 
ness and productivity;  for example,  in warmer  cities both workers  and 
employers  pay less for heating.  On this account  I would expect  a positive 
relation  between  a and z. On the other  hand,  many differences  will affect 
only  workers  or only  employers,  so there  need  not be any  strong  systematic 
relation  between  a and z. Rather than attempt  to create a theory that 
depends  on measurements  of a and  z, I will treat  them  as random  variables 
and ask what relation  between  wages and unemployment  is likely to be 
observed  in the face of random  differences  of the sort  just described. 
Nothing much is lost and a great  simplification  gained  by considering 
the following  linearized  versions  of the two conditions  for equilibrium: 
w =  (1 +  u -a); 
w =  (ho +hlu+z)X. 
The slope of the observed  relation  between  w and u induced  by differences 
in a and z is' 
OfW+ (I  -0)hifc, 
where 
0  =  x2  +  XW 
g2o2  +  2XWpo7a?7z  +  f20-2 
and  o-X  is the standard  deviation  of z, o-a is the standard  deviation  of a, and 
p is their  correlation.  Several  conclusions  follow from this formula.  First, 
if there  are  no differences  in productivity  among  cities  (o-  =  0), then 0 =  0 
and the slope  is hix, exactly  the slope of the equilibrium  condition  for em- 
ployers.  Similarly,  if there  are  no differences  in attractiveness  among  cities 
(oa  =  0), observed points trace out the equilibrium condition for workers. 
Otherwise,  the observed  relation  is different  from  either  equilibrium  condi- 
tion. If 0 lies between  0 and 1, the observed  slope must lie between  the 
slopes of the two equilibrium  conditions.  Since  both are positive,  the ob- 
served  relation  must  slope  upward.  A glance  at the formula  for 0 shows  that 
it will always  be positive  and less than one if a and z are positively  corre- 
lated  (which  I find  likely),  and  will in fact  behave  well  for negative  p as long 
as p exceeds  a certain  lower  limit. 
1. I will not burden  the reader  with the details. See Franklin  M. Fisher, The Identi- 
fication  Problem  in Econometrics  (McGraw-Hill,  1966),  Chaps. 1-3. By slope I mean the 
ratio of the expected  value of u*  w to the expected  value of u2. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Aaron  Gordon:  This  paper  falls  into two parts.  The first  is a useful  study  of 
the contribution  of labor  turnover  to unemployment,  both in the aggregate 
and among  different  sectors  in the labor  force.  The second  deals  with geo- 
graphical  differences  in wages  and unemployment  and is much  more  con- 
troversial.  In this part of the paper, I am convinced  neither  by Hall's 
analytical  model nor by his reported  statistical  results. 
The  findings  in the first  part  are  interesting.  On  the whole  they  contribute 
to our  understanding  of how unemployment  is generated  and  why  its level 
is different  for different  segments  of the labor force. Hall computes  the 
weekly probability  of a person  becoming  unemployed,  and of a person 
leaving  unemployment.  Unfortunately,  the data do not permit  him to dis- 
tinguish  unemployment  arising  from  layoffs  or quits  from  that  arising  from 
entering  or reentering  the labor force. That information  is particularly 
important  for youths  and married  women. 
I found  it difficult  to accept  Hall's  results  for teenagers.  He finds  that  the 
probability  of becoming  unemployed  in a given  week  is no greater  for male 
teenagers  than for 30-year-olds.  In addition,  he finds  that male teenagers 
spend a smaller  fraction  of the year unemployed  than do persons  of any 
other age group except those in their forties. That flatly contradicts  all 
other  evidence  on this problem  with  which  I am familiar.  The fact that the 
current  population  survey  may give particularly  unreliable  evidence  on 
teenage  unemployment  is certainly  relevant  but can hardly  be the entire 
answer.  Finally, one point to which not enough attention  is paid is the 
effect of occupation,  which is particularly  important  in unemployment 
differences  by age and sex. 
In the latter  part of the paper,  dealing  with geographical  differences  in 
unemployment  and real  wages,  the statistical  findings  are  presented  within 
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the framework  of what is called a theory of equilibrium.  This theory is 
static and, in effect,  assumes  perfect  competition  in product  markets  and 
local labor  markets.  Production  of goods and services  is subject  to dimin- 
ishing  marginal  productivity  in the short  run,  while  in the long run  margi- 
nal and average  productivity  of labor  may rise,  but only  through  technical 
change.  All employers  and  workers  are profit  maximizers.  Labor  and  capi- 
tal are free  to move geographically.  The corollary  to these assumptions  is 
that real  wages  must  fall as employment  expands,  except  as the production 
function  shifts  in the long run. 
If my description  is even  approximately  correct,  I fail to see the connec- 
tion between  this model and the world from which the actual data are 
taken. Hall assumes  that there are permanent  geographic  differentials  in 
unemployment  rates.  Judging  by the official  figures  for unemployment  in 
the twenty  largest  standard  metropolitan  statistical  areas  since  the begin- 
ning of the 1960s,  that assumption  does not hold up. A number  of the 
SMSAs did, indeed, retain  approximately  the same ranking,  having  the 
second  highest  or the tenth  highest  or the twelfth  highest  rate  of unemploy- 
ment,  but not all of them.  In Hall's  sample,  Chicago  has the lowest  unem- 
ployment  rate. Although  it had one of the lowest unemployment  rates 
throughout  the 1961-71  period,  its rate  was higher  than that of several  of 
the other twenty  largest  metropolitan  areas in 1961 and in most of the 
other  years  up to 1971.  Detroit  had  the highest  unemployment  rate  in 1961 
and again  in 1970  and 1971,  but was near  the median  during  the 1964-67 
period.  St. Louis was below the median  in 1964  and 1965  and above  it in 
1967. I was unable  to standardize  these rates for changes  in the various 
dimensions  in the 1Thor  force  as Hall did. But I assume  that this does not 
matter  much  for %iiui1ges  over a period  as short  as twelve  years. 
In Figure  2, the positive  slope  is not very  definite,  and  the standard  errors 
on the regression  coefficients  confirm  this uncertain  fit. If Detroit  and San 
Francisco  were  excluded,  would the regression  have any positive  slope at 
all?  This seems  to me a weak  empirical  basis  for the model,  or even  for an 
ad hoc generalization  that  high real  wages  and  high  unemployment  always 
go together-now, ten years  ago, or twenty  years  ago. Table  A-1 in the ap- 
pendix  reinforces  these  observations.  Four  out of the eleven  coefficients  for 
the SMSAs  for the probability  of becoming  unemployed  are smaller  than 
their standard  errors.  For the probability  of leaving  unemployment,  six 
coefficients  are  smaller  than their  standard  errors  and only three  are  equal Robert E. Hall  759 
to twice their standard  errors.  The correlations  are better for the other 
characteristics  measured  than for the ones on geographical  location. 
I missed  any reference  to differences  in occupational  and industrial  pat- 
terns of employment  among the standard  metropolitan  statistical  areas 
that  might  have  something  to do with  observed  unemployment  differences. 
And finally,  in his discussion  of deflating  wages  by city, Hall ignores  the 
difference  between  the deflated  wage concepts  that are relevant  for em- 
ployers  and for employees.  The employer  is concerned  with  product  wage 
in determining  profitability.  Presumably  it is the real wage that attracts 
the worker.  On a local or regional  basis, product  wages would be ex- 
tremely  difficult  to determine. 
Charles  Holt: I think Robert Hall has made an important  contribution 
with this paper.  He has combined  the dynamics  of turnover  in the labor 
market  and a competitive  model of prices  and wages  into a static  theory 
of wage  differentials.  The importance  of this accomplishment  is that most 
theory  up to this point  has come out with an equilibrium  price,  while  Hall 
comes  out with  two mechanisms  for allocating  resources  in these  imperfect 
markets:  One is the wage offered  and the other  is the availability  of jobs. 
That both of these are important  has long been recognized;  but Hall has 
made  real  progress  in putting  them  together  in a model  that has extremely 
fruitful  implications.  And his insight  should  carry  over to other  kinds of 
differentials  besides  the one on which  he reports. 
On more  specific  points:  The fact  that Hall's  model  of productivity  rises 
when  unemployment  rises  is clearly  a long-term  static  phenomenon.  It cer- 
tainly  is not true  cyclically,  where  labor productivity  increases  as employ- 
ment rises. As the empirical  work advances,  we must round out Hall's 
model  by fully  incorporating  it into a dynamic  theory  reflecting  this  cyclical 
behavior. 
The first part of the paper  contains a good deal of discussion  of the 
probabilities  of becoming unemployed  and of leaving unemployment. 
Hall's work suggests  that ratios of these probabilities  between  different 
groups  in the labor force are stable. One has to keep in mind that these 
ratios  were  observed  for 1966.  Some of them, like the black-white  unem- 
ployment  ratio,  are  known  to be relatively  stable.  More  recent  work,  how- 
ever, demonstrates  systematic  variation  in others.  These ratios certainly 
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In some of his inferences  about  policy,  Hall may have been premature. 
One has to be careful  not to conclude  that this paper  implies  unemploy- 
ment is a good thing simply on the basis of social efficiency  arguments. 
Before we use an efficiency  argument  alone, we must look carefully  at 
questions  like,  Who  is unemployed?  What  are  the economic  costs of unem- 
ployment  in terms  of suicide,  divorce,  crime?  What  is the impact  of unem- 
ployment  on income  distribution?  What  will be the impact  on future  labor 
force  participation  of young  people  suffering  high  levels  of unemployment? 
These kinds of issues  have to be much more thoroughly  explored  before 
we can begin  to think about  the policy implications  of Hall's analysis. 
In Figure 1, two curves-the  worker  equilibrium  and the employer 
equilibrium-are  depicted.  The discussion  points  out that they  might  cross 
in one of two ways,  depending  on which  is steeper.  The  policy  implications 
of this sound paradoxical:  Increasing  mobility  may increase  unemploy- 
ment,  and  labor  subsidies  may increase  unemployment.  The difficulty  here 
is that one kind of intersection  is unstable  and the other-the one drawn 
in Figure 1-is  stable.  In that case, mobility  and subsidies  would  produce 
the kind  of results  one  would  anticipate.  On  the other  hand,  with  the slopes 
shown,  the forces  restoring  equilibrium  once  it is disturbed  are  not strong. 
And this raises  the chances  that other  variables,  such  as union  influence  or 
flows of workers  into different  markets,  would  be important. 
Vacancy  statistics  for the cities could be added  to Table  4. They are in 
the analysis  now and appear  in the appendix.  We know quite a lot about 
the functional  form in which  vacancies  enter  the analysis  and even about 
the size of the parameters  to be expected.  The  log of both Hall's  alpha  and 
his beta variables  would be linearly  related  to the vacancy  rate and the 
unemployment  rate. 
I am puzzled  by Hall's denial of a connection  between  unemployment 
and wages  operating  through  labor  mobility.  On discovering  strong  equi- 
librium  patterns  of unemployment  and wages  across  cities,  Hall seems  in- 
clined  to accept  the equilibrium  as necessarily  a good thing.  Reallocating 
workers  from markets  that have more workers  than are needed  to others 
that have fewer  than could be absorbed  might  decrease  the total level of 
unemployment  and increase  output  without  increasing  inflation. 
Hall  recognizes  that  when  the  ratio  of vacancies  to unemployment  is high, 
quits  will be relatively  high. Many of those quitting  will not pass through 
unemployment  at all. Yet this process  of changing  jobs is an important 
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In the discussion  of social costs and benefits,  Hall considers  a "tax on 
employers  for the social  cost of withdrawing  workers  from  the pool of idle 
workers."  It is important  to recognize  that, although  he stresses  dynamic 
turnover  in his analysis  generally,  here  he refers  to a reduction  in the stock 
of workers,  not the gross  flow of new hires  from  the stock. 
The overall  thrust  of this paper  underlines  once again  the limitations  of 
aggregate  demand  policy in treating  inflation  and unemployment  and the 
need for effective  policy measures  to improve  the structure  of the labor 
market. 
Robert  Hall: In reply  to some of Aaron  Gordon's  comments,  let me first 
reiterate  that in the comparison  of cities  that I make,  I am talking  about  a 
long-run equilibrium  comparison  rather than transitory  differences  in 
unemployment.  Treating  them as long-run  differences  across  cities,  we are 
looking  at cases  where  the capital  stock  and  the level  of employment  are  in 
equilibrium  for purposes  of comparing  one city with another.  I certainly 
do not believe  my productivity  arguments  apply  in a cyclical  context. 
There  is one important  misunderstanding,  I believe,  in his criticism  of my 
basic model. I do not assume  decreasing  marginal  or average  product  of 
labor  in the long run.  High unemployment  does not necessarily  imply  low 
employment,  because  I consider  the size of the labor  force  free  to vary.  In 
the model,  the relation  between  unemployment  and productivity  operates 
not through  the level of employment  but directly  through  the personnel 
policies  of employers. 
The results  on teenagers  do pose a serious  problem.  However,  I do not 
think  we can take the official  data  from  the Current  Population  Survey  as 
the final  word  and  say that every  study  ought  to reproduce  those statistics. 
The  monthly  survey  statistics  have  some  serious  problems.  We know  about 
the rotation  group  problem:  The  answer  to how much  unemployment  there 
is varies considerably  depending  on how many months the respondents 
have  been  in the survey  sample,  and  this  problem  is especially  severe  among 
teenagers.  Unemployment  is a state of mind, and the mere act of asking 
about  it seems  to have a considerable  effect  on the answer.  Regarding  the 
results  for teenagers  in this paper,  I am working  on the problem  with  what 
I believe  will be much  better  data,  so I have  not given  the subject  too much 
attention  here. 
I am uncomfortable  about the issues  of adjusting  for occupational  dif- 
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tion is really  one of occupational  crowding.  It does not assume  that people 
are not paid the marginal  products,  but rather  that women  are crowded 
into certain  kinds  of occupations  and are paid their  marginal  products  in 
those occupations  even though  they may not be the best occupations  for 
them. If this is the case, introducing  dummy variables  for occupation 
would show substantial  effects.  But I would not be sure  how to interpret 
them. I would rather  have this kind of occupational  effect  show up as a 
difference  between  men and women  rather  than as an occupational  differ- 
ence. But I admit  to some uncertainty  about  exactly  how best to proceed. 
I did have some results  standardizing  for occupations.  They do not affect 
the basic conclusions  of the paper; but they do affect the comparison 
between  men and women  that is reported  here. 
As to equilibrium,  in my model,  basically  it is a condition  in which  no 
unexploited  opportunities  remain  through which individuals  can make 
themselves  better  off. I think the kind of theory  I have talked about is 
robust with respect  to some of the imperfections  in markets  that may 
exist, and that concern  Aaron  Gordon. 
Holt makes  the basic point that the parameters  I estimated  apply for 
1966  and  that  they  can  be expected  to change  through  time.  All of the work 
I have done should  be thought  of as a function  of time,  observed  at a par- 
ticular  point in time. The parameters  I report  characterize  the economy 
only for the 1966  cross-section. 
General  Discussion 
There  was considerable  criticism  of the role played  by the unemployed 
as a labor  reserve  in Hall's  model.  Charles  Schultze  described  the model  as 
an economy  in which  the presence  of unemployed  hungry  workers  reduces 
quits,  making  it possible  to have more  layoffs  and to schedule  production 
better.  Through  this mechanism,  a net increase  in productivity  is achieved 
by increasing  unemployment.  But Hall then  removes  this effect  by arguing 
that it is necessary  to pay enough  unemployment  compensation  to make 
sure that workers  are not hungry-that, indeed,  they are indifferent  be- 
tween employment  and unemployment.  And similarly,  Schultze  argued 
that there  was a big difference  between  having  3 million unemployed  ac- 
tively  seeking  a job and 3 million  unemployed  not scrambling  for a job at 
all. Hall replied  that it was not the hunger  of unemployed  workers  but Robert  E. Hall  763 
their  mere availability  that permitted  more efficient  personnel  policies  by 
firms  in a slack  labor  market.  Arthur  Okun  noted,  however,  that if unem- 
ployment  compensation  were  approximately  equal  to wages,  people  would 
take  jobs less  rapidly,  assuming  there  were  any  costs  to searching  for a job; 
on the other  hand, he pointed out, despite  specific  examples  to the con- 
trary,  unemployment  compensation  currently  replaces  only a small  fraction 
of lost wages. From mid-1969  to mid-1972,  for example,  unemployment 
compensation  payments  increased  by $3.5 billion (annual  rate) as unem- 
ployment  rose by 2 million  people. Hall agreed  that incentive  considera- 
tions implied  that the level of unemployment  compensation  ought  to be a 
parameter  in the model  helping  to determine  the socially  optimal  level of 
unemployment  and compensation,  but he felt that otherwise  his analysis 
remained  appropriate. 
Robert  Solow  pointed  out  the  uncertainty  about  where  equilibrium  would 
occur  in Hall's  type of model.  Only  a small  change  in the slope  of the equi- 
librium  locus between  employees  and employers  would  lead to larger  dif- 
ferences  in unemployment  rates. If Hall's model is taken literally,  zero 
unemployment  would  be optimal  when  the slope was flat. If there  were  a 
noticeable  slope, the marginal  productivity  of unemployment  would be 
very high, and implausibly  high unemployment  rates, along with large 
unemployment  compensation  payments,  would  be called  for.  R. J. Gordon 
thought that Hall's regression  could support  two different  stories. The 
first  is the one he has told, in which  all workers  are  homogeneous;  in tight 
labor markets  employers  need a large personnel  department,  which re- 
duces  productivity.  The other story is that in low-unemployment  econo- 
mies, the employer  scrapes  the bottom of the barrel,  employing  people 
with low ability. This situation  reduces  the average  productivity  of all 
workers  but imposes  no social  cost because  the productivity  of the people 
hired  earlier  is not affected.  Hall agreed  that his regression  slopes could 
contain  some of this second  effect. 
William  Poole questioned  the assumption  of externalities  to unemploy- 
ment. He noted that, if unemployment  compensation  did not exist, in 
competitive  labor  markets  wages  would  be higher  in occupations  that  have 
predictable  seasonal  patterns  of unemployment  than in occupations  that 
did not, so that, allowing  for the value  of leisure,  annual  earnings  would  be 
the same. He argued  that this same effect  should operate  between  Hall's 
high- and low-unemployment  markets  and would not give rise to ex- 
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exist. He could imagine  a labor market  operating  as Poole described,  in 
which the private returns  to remaining  unemployed  equaled  the social 
returns  because  the worker  would  do all the work  of finding  the  job. How- 
ever, the empirical  results  suggest  that this is not true. Some evidence 
exists  that suggests  an externality  such that employers  have a role in the 
process  of finding  work.  In its extreme,  this theory  of unemployment  has 
all unemployed  workers  sitting  around  idle exactly  as if they were  idle on 
the  job. They  are  providing  a useful  service  by making  themselves  available 
to employers  but they are  not being  compensated  for it. Poole questioned 
whether,  if such externalities  do exist,  there  would  not be more  firms  pro- 
viding  temporary  workers  to other  firms  that had fluctuating  employment 
needs.  Hall replied  that the externality  is global because  the unemployed 
worker  is functioning  as a reserve  across  a wide variety  of alternative  em- 
ployers.  Thus  there  is no way  to internalize  it completely  except  by collec- 
tive action  across  the whole  society.  That  is why  the government  has to be 
responsible  for maintaining  the appropriate  level of employment  and 
compensating  unemployed  workers  just as they would be compensated 
within  the firm. 
R. J. Gordon pointed out that the results  for different  demographic 
groups  are  very  hard  to interpret  when  participation  rates  vary  as much  as 
they do. So long as the probability  of leaving unemployment  included 
probabilities  for both dropping  out and  finding  work,  the results  could  not 
be compared  across groups. He noted that this might help explain  the 
unusual results for teenagers,  since their low unemployment  durations 
reflected  periods  spent  out of the work force  rather  than unemployed. 
Hyman  Kaitz  noted  that different  cities  had markedly  different  employ- 
ment  patterns,  a fact  that  might  influence  Hall's  intercity  comparisons.  They 
differ  noticeably  in the participation  rates of secondary  workers  in the 
labor force and in the proportion  of workers  looking  for part-time  work. 
Since  all the evidence  suggests  that  unemployment  is a threshold  phenome- 
non and  that  small  differences  in circumstances  or habits  can  push  a person 
over the threshold,  unemployment  measures  for different  cities might  not 
be exactly  comparable.  Kaitz also noted that annual  surveys  of work ex- 
perience  have shown respondents  to be quite reliable  in recalling  their 
employment,  but less so in recalling  unemployment.  This may be behind 
some of the discrepancy  in the teenage  unemployment  results  reported  by 
Hall compared  with the results from the monthly Current  Population 
Survey. 